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Abstract
The neoclassical growth model predicts large capital flows towards fast-growing
emerging countries. We show that incorporating fertility and longevity into a lifecycle
model of savings changes the standard predictions when countries differ in their ability
to borrow inter-temporally and across generations through social security. In this en-
vironment, global aging triggers capital flows from emerging to developed countries,
and countries’ current account positions respond to growth adjusted by current and
expected demographic composition. Data on international capital flows are broadly
supportive of the theory. The fact that fast-growing emerging countries are also aging
faster, while having less developed credit markets and pension systems, explains why
they are more likely to export capital. Our quantitative multi-country overlapping-
generations model explains a significant fraction of the patterns of capital flows, across
time and across developed and emerging countries.
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1 Introduction
The world is aging and is expected to age further in the years to come. Over the last
decades, fertility and mortality have been falling worldwide, with emerging countries con-
verging towards the demographic patterns of the developed world (Figure 1.1, panels (a)
and (b); see also Lee (2003)). While the world was essentially bi-modal in the early sixties —
with developed countries already characterized by low fertility and high life expectancy,
versus emerging countries characterized by higher fertility and lower life expectancy —
demographic patterns have become more homogenous across the globe (Figure 1.2).
Despite overall convergence, panels (c) and (d) of Figure 1.1 reveal substantial hetero-
geneity in the timing and pace of demographic evolutions since the 1950s — especially
among the group of emerging/developing countries. While South-East Asia has converged
very fast towards the developed world both in terms of fertility and longevity, the rest of
Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and North Africa have converged at a slower pace;
and Sub-Saharan Africa still has fairly high fertility and mortality rates.
The goal of this paper is to investigate how these broad demographic trends, featuring
both common and country-specific components, can help explain patterns of international
capital flows over time and across regions. Central to our analysis is the interaction be-
tween demographic evolutions and cross-country heterogeneity in access to credit (i.e.,
ability to transfer resources over time) and social security (i.e., ability to transfer resources
across generations).
While the global trend in aging should affect world savings and investment, interna-
tional capital flows should be left unaffected according to standard theory.1 Capital flows
would only arise if some countries were aging faster than others. Over time, as demo-
graphic patterns converge across countries, one would thus expect to see less capital flows
between countries. In the data instead, the turn of the century was marked by large net
capital flows — with vast amounts of capital flowing uphill from emerging to developed
countries in the years 2000s (Bernanke (2005), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009)).
The first contribution of our paper is to show that global aging can be a powerful driver
1In a standard OLG setting for instance, if all individuals across the globe are expected to live longer,
savings should increase significantly on impact before falling as the share of retirees increases. However, all
countries cannot simultaneously run a current account surplus, followed by deficits later on. In equilibrium,
the world interest rate would adjust, leaving capital flows unchanged.
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(b) Longevity: Developed vs Emerging countries
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(c) Fertility across Regions
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Figure 1.1: Global Aging: Fertility and Longevity across the World, 1950-2040
Notes: Panels (a) and (c) show fertility rate adjusted for infant mortality. Panel (b) and (d) show the probabil-
ity of surviving until age 65 conditional on being 25. See Appendix A for data sources and list of countries.
of capital flows if the response of savings and investment to the common demographic trend
differs across countries. Cross-country differences in the ability to borrow over the lifecycle
(i.e., heterogenous levels of financial development across countries) as well as differences
in the ability to borrow across generations (i.e., heterogeneity in retirement systems) can
generate large differences in the savings responses to world aging, thus leading to diverg-
ing net foreign asset positions across countries. In particular, global aging can be a source
of uphill capital flows — whereby emerging countries lend to richer countries, which typ-
ically have more developed credit markets and and a wider social security coverage.
A second contribution of the paper is to investigate differences in aging patterns across
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Figure 1.2: Fertility Rates and Life Expectancy: Cross-Country Distributions
Notes: The histograms in panels (a) and (b) represent the distribution across countries of fertility rates ad-
justed for infant mortality. The histograms in panels (c) and (d) represent the distribution across countries of
life expectancy at birth. See Appendix A for data sources and list of countries.
countries as a potential driver of capital flows — with a particular focus on developing
countries. While all countries are aging on average, they do so at a different speed and
at different points in time. Whereas some developing countries are aging faster than the
world average, others started their demographic transition later and at a much slower
speed — Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular. In our model, emerging countries with faster
aging prospects are more likely to export capital. Figure 1.3 suggests that this is also true in
the data.2 Interestingly, if the fast-aging developing countries have on average higher pro-
2This regularity confirms the findings of recent empirical work done for developed countries (see Domeij
and Flode´n (2006) and Ferrero (2010) among others), while extending the analysis to a large set of developing
countries, for which demographic evolutions are arguably more dispersed.
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Figure 1.3: Country-Specific Aging and Capital Flows in Emerging Countries
Notes: For each country, expected aging is defined as the expected change in the old-dependency ratio be-
tween 2010 and 2035 (annualized). Current account (as a percentage of GDP) is the average of annual current
account over GDP for the period 1990-2010. Sample of emerging countries excluding oil producers. See
Appendix A for data sources and list of countries.
ductivity growth than the slow-aging ones, demographics could help explain why capital
is not flowing towards the fast growing emerging countries — a phenomenon known as
the ‘allocation puzzle’ (Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012)). Our model also has some distinct
implications for developed countries: since Continental Europe and Japan have been aging
faster than the US and other Anglo-Saxon economies, our theory predicts that the latter are
more likely to be capital recipients in the recent period, especially as their household credit
markets are the most developed.
We first articulate our theory of aging and capital flows in a stylized multi-country over-
lapping generations model. In a given country, three generations coexist: young agents
borrow against future income; the middle-aged work, contribute to finance social security,
and save for retirement; the elderly consume out of their savings and retirement benefits.
The ability to borrow when young and the extent of contributions to social security (and
the associated benefits) differ across countries and are assumed to be higher in developed
countries. Global and country-specific demographic trends are captured by exogenous fer-
tility and probability of surviving into old age.
This simple framework provides the minimum set of ingredients to explore the impact
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of fertility and longevity on capital flows when countries differ in their ability to transfer
resources over time and across generations. In this framework, we derive conditions under
which global aging triggers uphill capital flows, from emerging to developed countries.
This happens if the fall in the interest rate in response to world aging is large enough—i.e.,
for a low enough elasticity of intertemporal substitution and a low enough level of social
security globally. Uphill capital flows are reinforced if the financing of social security in
developed countries adjusts (to the pressure exerted by population aging) mostly through
higher contribution rates, rather than through lower retirement benefits.
The uphill capital flows triggered by global aging are driven by a divergence in savings
across countries. With a large fall in the interest rate and a small adjustment of retirement
benefits, aggregate savings in the developed world tend to fall due to higher borrowing by
the young and less savings by the middle aged — the latter being caused by a combination
of higher contributions to social security and a higher present value of their future retire-
ment benefits (wealth effect). By contrast, savings in emerging countries tend to increase in
response to global aging, due to higher longevity combined with low social security and a
different response to a drop in the interest rate. A lower ability to borrow against future in-
come and future generations dampens the wealth and the substitution effect of the interest
rate on savings while strengthening the income effect.
We also explore in the model how capital flows are affected by country-specific aging
prospects — focusing our attention on emerging countries. Countries which experience
their demographic transition at the time they integrate to the world capital market start to
export capital very quickly (possibly as soon as they open up), even more so if their credit
markets and social security system are underdeveloped. Countries which start their demo-
graphic transition at a later stage are more likely to experience capital inflows at opening.
While our stylized model of aging and capital flows is useful to deliver the main the-
oretical insights of the paper analytically (in closed form), our objective is to provide a
quantitative framework that can be confronted with data on capital flows across countries
and over time. In the extended version of the model, the crucial ingredients are the same
but agents can live for a larger number of periods, with a given probability of dying at
the end of each period. We consider several regions, and for each we calibrate mortality,
fertility and productivity growth rates to the data, and to the extent of data availability,
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we also calibrate the contribution rates to social security and the development of house-
hold credit markets. Based on our calibration, we simulate the world economy over the
period 1960-2040, starting from complete autarky until 1980 when world capital markets
integrate.3
Our quantitative model is broadly able to reproduce qualitatively and quantitatively
the patterns of capital flows observed across countries, both emerging and developed, over
the last three decades. Initially, in the eighties, the size of capital flows is relatively mod-
est despite massive differences in demographic composition across countries, and capital
tends to flow from Old Continental Europe and Japan to the younger regions. As emerging
countries integrate to world capital markets, most of them initially import capital — but
much less so than predicted by a standard neoclassical model. Due to its fast growth, East
Asia attracts capital flows despite its fast aging prospects, while the rest of the developing
countries also attract capital as they are expected to stay young relatively longer.
Later on in the late nineties, as some emerging countries (most notably East Asia) are
aging faster than the rest of the world, they turn into creditors, slowly replacing Old Eu-
rope as an important world lender — a trend further reinforced by global aging. Instead,
countries with a delayed demographic transition (Sub-Saharan Africa and to a lesser extent
South and Central Asia) become the main debtors among the developing countries, despite
their slower growth path. In the developed world, global aging reinforces the position of
Anglo-Saxon countries as large debtors, while it brings Old Europe closer to balance —
Japan remaining an important creditor as it is aging more and growing less.
Our paper relates to existing work on capital flows and demographics (Backus, Cooley
and Henriksen (2014), Brooks (2003), Choukhmane (2012), Domeij and Floden (2006), Fer-
rero (2010), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996)) which focus mostly on developed countries. Our
paper also differs from theirs by investigating how global trends can generate capital flows
when countries are heterogeneous in their level of development (financial markets and
welfare systems). Recent studies by Attanasio, Kitao, Violante (2007), Krueger and Ludwig
(2007), Borsch-Supan, Ludwig, Winter (2006) investigate retirement systems, potentially
different across countries, in a global economy but these mostly focus on implications for
3In future iterations of the paper, we will also explore scenarios where different groups of countries inte-
grate to the world capital market at different points of time.
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the financing of social security and for welfare across countries and generations, rather
than on capital flows. Finally, from a theoretical perspective, our work also relates to a
large literature which investigates the mechanisms driving global imbalances and uphill
capital flows.4 We see our contribution as complementary to theirs as none of these papers
focuses on demographics and global aging as an important driver of capital flows from
developing countries to developed countries. With respect to our empirical contribution,
our investigation of demographic changes as a source of capital flows in the model and
in the data is related to a literature on the medium-run determinants of current account
deficits.5 Contrary to these papers, equipped with our theoretical predictions, we show
that expected changes in aging are the main factor behind cross-country differences in cap-
ital flows — instead of current demographic compositions.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops a stylized model of aging and
capital where we derive our main theoretical results and convey the main intuitions be-
hind our findings. Section 3 presents the quantitative model calibrated to the data and
confronts our quantitative predictions on capital flows across countries and over time to
their empirical counterpart. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theory
The world consists of multiple countries, populated by overlapping generations of agents
who live at most for three periods: youth (y), middle age (m), and retirement (o). Agents
only work when they are middle-aged. Preferences are identical across countries, and all
countries use the same technology to produce one homogeneous good — which is used for
consumption and investment, and is traded freely and costlessly. Labor is immobile across
countries, and firms are subject to changes in country-specific productivity and labor force.
To begin with, we describe our setup by considering only one country in isolation (we
therefore omit country indices at this stage to simplify notations).
4See among others Aguiar and Amador (2011), Bacchetta and Benhima (2013), Benhima (2013), Caballero,
Farhi and Gourinchas (2008), Carroll and Jeanne (2009), Coeurdacier, Guibaud and Jin (2014), Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2011), Mendoza, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (2009), Sandri (2010), Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti
(2011). See the survey in Gourinchas and Rey (2013) for further references.
5See Alfaro et al. (2014), Chinn and Prasad (2003), Higgins (1998), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002), Taylor
and Williamson (1994) and a meta-analysis by Cazorzi et al. (2012) for further references. See Bloom et al.
(2003) for the determinants of aggregate savings across countries and Leff (1969) for a seminal contribution.
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Demographics. All agents reach middle age with probability one, but a middle-aged agent
in period t survives to old age with probability pt. Individuals of the same generation are
grouped into households, each comprising a continuum of agents. Young and middle-aged
households are of measure one, whereas the mass of an elderly household in period t+ 1 is
given by pt. Let Ly,t (respectively Lm,t) denote the number of young (respectively middle-
aged) households in period t. Each young household in period t − 1 has nt children, such
that Ly,t = ntLy,t−1. It follows that Lm,t+1 = ntLm,t, i.e., the growth rate of the labor force
between t and t+ 1 is given by (nt − 1).
Production. There is a unique final good used for both consumption and investment. Pro-
duction uses labour supplied inelastically by middle-aged agents:
Yt = K
α
t (AtLm,t)
1−α ,
where Kt denotes the capital stock accumulated at the end of period t−1, and At is labour-
augmenting productivity, which grows at an exogenous rate γA,t+1 between period t and
t+ 1. Labour and capital markets are competitive. Assuming full capital depreciation over
a generation, the wage rate wt in period t and the gross rate of return Rt between periods
t− 1 and t are given by:
wt = (1− α)Atkαt and Rt = αkα−1t , (1)
respectively, where kt ≡ Kt/(AtLm,t) denotes the capital-effective-labour ratio.
Social Security. Middle-aged workers pay social security contributions proportional to
their wage income, at rate τt. An agent who reaches retirement in period t + 1 receives
social benefits σt+1wt, where σt+1 denotes the replacement rate in period t + 1. The social
security system (‘Pay-as-you-go’) runs a balanced budget in every period, which requires
that the contribution and replacement rates satisfy:
ptσt+1wt = ntτt+1wt+1. (2)
A higher old-dependency ratio (Lo,t+1/Lm,t+1 = pt/nt) or smaller wage growth (wt+1/wt)
exert pressure on the financing of the retirement system, which needs to adjust through a
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combination of higher contribution rates (τt+1) or smaller replacement rates (σt+1).
Household Preferences and Budget Constraints. Let cχ,t denote the consumption in pe-
riod t of an agent of generation χ ∈ {y,m, o}. A young household in period t−1 maximizes
the following lifetime utility with a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1),
Ut−1 = u(cy,t−1) + βu(cm,t) + β2ptu(co,t+1),
which is the expected lifetime utility of any individual in the household, or is the total
lifetime utility of all members. We assume that the per period utility is given by u(c) =
c1−1/ω
1−1/ω , where ω ≤ 1 denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.6 The maximization
is subject to the following budget constraints:
cy,t−1 + ay,t−1 = 0, (3)
cm,t + am,t = (1− τt)wt +Rtay,t−1, (4)
co,t+1 =
Rt+1am,t
pt
+ σt+1wt. (5)
Since the young do not work, the household needs to borrow to finance consumption,
ay,t−1 < 0 denotes the value of their end-of-period net asset holdings. Gross labor income
earned in middle age is used for debt repayment, contribution to social security, consump-
tion, and asset accumulation, where am,t denotes the amount of assets accumulated for
retirement. At the end of the middle-age period, the assets held by the mass of agents
who do not survive are transferred to the mass of those who do within the household, so
that an individual who reaches retirement earns gross income from savings Rt+1am,t/pt.
Elderly agents consume all available resources, including social security benefits, leaving
no bequests.
Credit Constraints. Young households are subject to a credit constraint, whereby they
cannot borrow more than a given fraction of their discounted future gross labor income. A
6The assumption that ω ≤ 1 is standard and in line with the empirical evidence. Since the seminal paper
of Hall (1988), estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution are typically below 0.5 (see Attanasio
and Weber (1993), Ogaki and Reinhart (1998), Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), and Yogo (2004) among others). The
macro and asset pricing literature discussed in Guvenen (2006) typically assumes values between 0.5 and 1.
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young household in period t− 1 faces the constraint:
ay,t−1 ≥ −θt−1wt
Rt
,
where θt−1 measures the level of development of credit markets in period t− 1. We assume
that the constraint is binding in every period, which implies that7
cy,t−1 = −ay,t−1 = θt−1wt
Rt
. (6)
Saving Decisions. The first order condition with respect to middle-age consumption yields
the following Euler equation:
(co,t+1)
1/ω = βRt+1(cm,t)
1/ω. (7)
Using the above equation along with (4), (5), and (6), accumulated wealth at middle age
can be expressed as:
am,t =
pt(1− τt − θt−1)
pt + β−ωR1−ωt+1
wt − β
−ωR1−ωt+1
pt + β−ωR1−ωt+1
ptσt+1wt
Rt+1
. (8)
The first term in (8) involves the fraction of wages net of taxes and debt repayment that is
saved for the next period.8 This fraction is increasing in the probability of survival pt, and
as long as ω < 1, decreasing in the rate of interest Rt+1. The second term in (8) captures the
impact on middle-aged savings of the retirement benefits received in old age. The reduc-
tion in middle-aged savings coming from this term can be interpreted as intergenerational
borrowing: effectively, middle-aged agents borrow against their future pension benefits,
i.e., against the social security contributions levied on the middle-aged workers of next pe-
riod. Through a wealth effect, this amount of borrowing is decreasing in Rt+1. Using (1)
and (2), we can rewrite (8) as:
am,t =
pt(1− τt − θt−1)
pt + β−ωR1−ωt+1
(1− α)Atkαt −
1− α
α
β−ωR1−ωt+1
pt + β−ωR1−ωt+1
ntτt+1At+1kt+1. (9)
7See Appendix B for conditions under which this assumption holds.
8Note that net disposable income in middle age is only positive if θt−1 < 1− τt. We assume that this holds
in all periods, otherwise there would be no savers in the economy.
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2.1 Autarky Equilibrium
We first characterize equilibrium under financial autarky, focusing on the determinants of
the interest rate. The insights derived here will be useful to understand the determinants of
the world interest rate and capital flows in Section 2.2. Under autarky, market clearing in
period t requires that total assets accumulated at the end of period t equals the total capital
stock at the beginning of period t+ 1:
Ly,tay,t + Lm,tam,t = Kt+1.
Substituting the expression for ay,t and am,t from (6) and (9) and re-arranging yields:
nt(1 + γA,t+1)
[
1 +
1− α
α
(
θt +
β−ωR1−ωt+1
pt + β−ωR1−ωt+1
τt+1
)]
kt+1 =
pt(1− τt − θt−1)
pt + β−ωR1−ωt+1
(1− α)kαt . (10)
The left-hand side corresponds to the supply of assets, which is increasing in the growth
rate of productivity, γA,t+1, and of the labor force, nt, between periods t and t + 1, as well
as in the ability to borrow over the lifecycle, θt, and across generations, τt+1. The latter
effect, as discussed earlier, comes from a reduction in middle-aged savings in anticipation
of social security benefits received in period t + 1. The right-hand side corresponds to
the demand for assets by the middle aged that would prevail absent future social security
benefits. It is increasing in the survival probability, pt, decreasing in the current tax rate, τt,
paid by middle-aged savers, decreasing in their ability to borrow when young, θt−1, and
decreasing in the interest rate, Rt+1 as long as ω < 1. Equations (1) and (10) summarize the
dynamics of the economy.
Autarky Steady State. Suppose productivity grows at a constant rate γA, the tightness of
credit constraints remains constant, θt = θ, and demographic and social security variables
are constant, nt = n, pt = p, τt = τ , implying a constant replacement rate, σ = np (1 + γA)τ .
The following proposition defines the equilibrium steady-state interest rate.
Proposition 1. An economy where γA, n, p, θ and τ are all constant converges to its unique stable
steady-state. The steady-state gross interest rate R is implicitly given by:
R =
n(1 + γA)
p(1− τ − θ)
[
p
(
α
1− α + θ
)
+ β−ωR1−ω
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)]
. (11)
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For ω = 1, this simplifies to
R =
n(1 + γA)
βp(1− τ − θ)
[
(1 + βp)
(
α
1− α + θ
)
+ τ
]
. (12)
The autarky rate is increasing in the level of social security contributions, τ , and increasing in the
looseness of the borrowing constraint, θ.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 1 shows that countries with better social security or looser borrowing con-
straints have higher autarky rates. Indeed, more developed social security (resp., better ac-
cess to credit) increases borrowing against future generations (resp., future labor income),
while reducing the savings of the the middle-aged by reducing their net disposable income.
Based on Equation (11), we now analyze the impact of demographics on the steady-
state interest rate. The steady-state comparative statics results presented here are useful
to understand the impact of aging on the interest rate in the transition. In the absence of
social security (τ = σ = 0), population aging (i.e., a fall in n or a rise in p) unambiguously
leads to a lower autarky rate, as stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. In a country without social security, the steady-state autarky rate, R0, satisfies:
R0 =
n(1 + γA)
p(1− θ)
(
α
1− α + θ
)(
p+ β−ωR1−ω0
)
.
The autarky rate, R0, is increasing in fertility, n, and decreasing in longevity, p. The elasticities
of the autarky interest rate with respect to fertility and longevity, denoted by η0,x =
∂R0/R0
∂x/x
for
x = {n, p}, can be expressed as:
η0,n =
1
1− (1− ω)φ0 and η0,p = −
φ0
1− (1− ω)φ0 ,
where φ0 =
(βR0)1−ω
βp+(βR0)1−ω
∈ [0, 1]. The magnitude of these elasticities is falling in ω, i.e. ∂|η0,x|
∂ω
< 0
for x = {n, p}.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The effect of demographic variables on autarky rates is intuitive. Higher fertility, n, leads
to higher autarky rates by increasing the marginal productivity of capital and the share
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of borrowers in the economy. Rising longevity, p, increases the incentives to save of the
middle-aged, thus lowering the autarky rate. Moreover, a lower elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, ω, reduces the sensitivity of net savings to the interest rate, implying that the
equilibrium requires a larger adjustment of the interest rate. This in turn implies that the
lower is ω, the stronger is the response of interest rates to demographic variables.9
In the presence of social security, the impact of demographics on the interest rate is
slightly more involved — due to the indirect effect of demographics going through adjust-
ments of the pension system. Indeed, a lower fertility, n, or a higher longevity, p, require
higher contribution and/or lower replacement rates for the social security budget to re-
main balanced. To characterize the dependence of the steady-state interest rate on demo-
graphic variables, we assume that the elasticity of the contribution rate to population aging
is constant and independent of the source of aging, i.e., we proceed under the assumption
that10
−∂τ/τ
∂n/n
=
∂τ/τ
∂p/p
≡ ε, ε ∈ [0, 1].
For instance, if the social security system adjusts to population aging entirely through an
increase in the contribution rate, with no adjustment in the replacement rate, then ε is equal
to 1. The following corollary summarizes the response of the interest rate to aging in an
economy with social security.
Corollary 2. In a country with social security the steady-state autarky rate, R, defined by (11), is
increasing in fertility, n, and decreasing in longevity, p, as long as the contribution rate is not too
high, τ < τmax, where τmax is defined in Appendix B. The elasticities of the autarky rate with respect
to aging (i.e., fall in n or increase in p) can be decomposed into two terms of opposite sign as follows:
−ηn =− ∂R/R
∂n/n
= − 1
1− (1− ω)φτ + τε
φτ/
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
+ 1/(1− θ − τ)
1− (1− ω)φτ , (13)
ηp =
∂R/R
∂p/p
= − φτ
1− (1− ω)φτ + τε
φτ/
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
+ 1/(1− θ − τ)
1− (1− ω)φτ , (14)
where φτ ∈ [0, 1] is defined in Appendix B and satisfies limτ→0 φτ = φ0.
9In particular, by evaluating the elasticities at ω = 1, one can see that for ω < 1, η0,n > 1 and |η0,p| > 11+βp .
10This is an assumption on the steady-state level of the contribution rate τ = τ(n, p, γA). By assuming that
ε ∈ [0, 1], we are deriving comparative statics under the natural assumption that the steady-state contribution
rate τ (resp. the steady-state replacement rate σ) does not fall (resp. increase) when the steady-state old
dependency ratio p/n increases.
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Proof. See Appendix B.
Corollary 2 shows that the rate of adjustment of the interest rate to demographic changes
depends on the extent of social security. For τ not too high, the autarky rate falls as the pop-
ulation ages, which corroborates the insight from Corollary 1. However in the presence of
social security, when ε > 0, the response of the interest rate is limited due to the increase
in contribution rate (second term in (13) and (14)). Indeed, an increase in the old depen-
dency ratio triggers a rise in contribution rates, which limits the increase of net savings and
dampens the fall in the autarky rate.11
Figure 2.1 summarizes the values of the elasticity of the interest rate to aging as a func-
tion of the level of social security contributions, τ , and of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, ω, for ε = 0.8. Essentially, a higher contribution rate or a higher elasticity of
intertemporal substitution lowers the sensitivity of the autarky rate to aging.
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Figure 2.1: Magnitude of the Interest Rate Response to Aging
Notes: The left panel shows the value of the elasticity of the autarky interest rate with respect to fertility, n,
while the right panel shows the negative of the elasticity with respect to longevity, p, for different values of
social security contribution rates, τ , and of inter-temporal elasticity of substitutions, ω. Parameter values are
β = 0.975 (annual basis), α = 0.3, θ = 0.15, and ε = 0.8, γA = 1.5% (annual basis), p = 0.8, n = 1.1. A period
is 25 years.
11Note that if taxes did not adjust in response to changes in demographic composition (i.e., ε = 0), popula-
tion aging would affect the autarky rate very similarly as in the absence of social security. The behaviour is
almost identical for low levels of taxes, as φτ ≈ φ0 in the neighbourhood of τ = 0.
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2.2 Integrated Equilibrium
We now consider the world economy, which consists of N countries indexed by i, each
characterized by an OLG structure as previously described. Let γiA,t, n
i
t, pit, τ it , and θit denote
country-specific exogenous variables for i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Financial integration in period t implies that capital flows freely across borders until coun-
try interest rates are equal to the world interest rate: Rit+1 = Rt+1 and kit+1 = kt+1 for all
i ∈ {1, ..., N}. The capital market clearing condition is given by:
∑
i
(
Liy,ta
i
y,t + L
i
m,ta
i
m,t
)
=
∑
i
Kit+1 = kt+1
∑
i
Ait+1L
i
m,t+1
Using optimal individual asset holdings, described by (6) and (9), the above yields the
equivalent of equation (10) at the world level:
kt+1
∑
i
nit(1 + γ
i
A,t+1)A
i
tL
i
m,t
[
1 +
1− α
α
(
θit +
β−ωR1−ωt+1
pit + β
−ωR1−ωt+1
τ it+1
)]
= kαt
∑
i
AitL
i
m,t
pit(1− τ it − θit−1)
pit + β
−ωR1−ωt+1
(1− α). (15)
The top line is the supply of assets at the world level, which has to equal the total demand
by middle-aged savers, shown in the bottom line.
Integrated Steady State. Assume that the effective labour supply in all countries grows
at the same constant rate, ni(1 + γiA) = 1 + γ for all i ∈ {1, ..., N}. Moreover assume that
all other demographic and social security variables are constant in each country: pit = pi,
τ it = τ
i, σit = σi, and θit = θi for all t and all i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
Proposition 2. Under the above assumptions there exists a unique integrated steady state, where
the world interest rate is implicitly defined by:
∑
i
λini(1 + γiA)
[
α
1− α +
(
θi +
β−ωR1−ω
pi + β−ωR1−ω
τ i
)]
= R
∑
i
λi
pi(1− τ i − θi)
pi + β−ωR1−ω
(16)
where λi denotes the relative size of country i in terms of effective labour force, λi ≡ AitLim,t∑
i A
i
tL
i
m,t
. The
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net foreign asset position of country i normalized by its GDP is:
NFAit
Y it
=
pi(1− α)(1− τ i − θi)
pi + β−ωR1−ω
− n
i(1 + γiA)
R
[
α + (1− α)
(
θi +
β−ωR1−ω
pi + β−ωR1−ω
τ i
)]
, (17)
where R is implicitly given by (16).
2.2.1 Global Aging and Capital Flows
Consider an integrated steady state where countries are identical in terms of demographics
and productivity growth, with pi = p, ni = n, 1 + γiA = 1 + γA, and only differ in the extent
of social security, τ i, and the ease of borrowing against future income, θi. Equation (16) can
be rewritten as:
R =
n(1 + γA)
p(1− τ − θ)
[
p
(
α
1− α + θ
)
+ β−ωR
1−ω
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)]
, (18)
where θ =
∑
i λ
iθi and τ =
∑
i λ
iτ i correspond to the world average level of credit con-
straints and of contribution rates, respectively. Comparing Equations (18) and (11), it is
immediate that the world interest rate coincides with the interest rate that would prevail
under autarky in a country characterized by θ and τ . Importantly, in light of Corollaries
1 and 2, this implies that the world interest rate tends to fall with global aging. Indeed,
if we denote by ηn ≡ ∂R/R∂n/n (resp. ηp ≡ ∂R/R∂p/p ) the elasticity of the world interest rate with
respect to the common fertility rate n (resp. survival probability p), we know that ηn > 0
and ηp < 0 as long as the world average contribution rate τ is not too high.
Turning to countries’ net foreign asset positions, we first observe that in the integrated
steady state with symmetric demographics and productivity growth, a country character-
ized by (θi, τ i) tends to export capital if θi < θ and/or if τ i < τ . This result can be viewed
as a direct consequence of Proposition 1. Indeed, the autarky interest rate of a country
characterized by (θi, τ i) tends to be lower than the world interest rate, R, if θi < θ and/or
if τ i < τ .
Corollary 3. If countries only differ in their level of social security contributions and in the ease of
borrowing against future income, then the net foreign asset position of a country characterized by
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(θi, τ i) in the steady state is given by:
NFAit
Y it
=(1− α)(θ − θi)
[
p
p+ β−ωR
1−ω +
n(1 + γA)
R
]
+
p(1− α)(τ − τ i)
p+ β−ωR
1−ω
[
1 +
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
]
, (19)
where R is given by (18). This implies that a country with tighter credit constraints than the world
average level, θi < θ, and/or with lower social security than the world average level, τ i < τ , tends
to export capital.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Next, we analyze the impact of global aging on capital flows, driven by cross-country dif-
ferences in credit markets and social security. To do so, we characterize the impact of demo-
graphic variables, n and p, on the dispersion in net foreign asset positions at the integrated
steady state. We then complement the steady-state comparative statics with numerical re-
sults showing the impact of global aging in the transition.
Global Aging and Heterogeneity in Credit Constraints. We start by considering two
countries, denoted by H and L, differing only in the tightness of the borrowing constraint
on young households, with θL < θ < θH . Corollary 3 implies that in steady state, country
H is a debtor, while country L is a creditor. Using (19), the steady-state difference in net
foreign asset positions relative to GDP across the two countries is given by:
NFALt
Y Lt
− NFA
H
t
Y Ht
= (1− α)(θH − θL)
[
p
p+ β−ωR
1−ω +
n(1 + γA)
R
]
. (20)
The following proposition summarizes the impact of global aging on capital flows between
countries H and L.
Proposition 3. A fall in fertility leads to a larger dispersion of net foreign assets over GDP if
ηn ≥ 1. A rise in longevity, p, unambiguously leads to a larger dispersion of net foreign assets over
GDP. The stronger is the interest rate response to aging (i.e., the larger ηn and
∣∣ηp∣∣), the larger is
the increase in dispersion.
Proof. See Appendix B.
17
Following a fall in global fertility, n, the dispersion of net foreign assets over GDP is gov-
erned by two conflicting forces: a direct effect and a world interest rate channel. As fertil-
ity falls globally, the world interest rate, R, falls, leading to more borrowing by young
households and, for ω < 1, more savings by middle-aged households. The former effect is
stronger in the country with looser borrowing constraints, theH country, while the latter is
stronger in the country with stricter borrowing constraints, the L country. As a result, the
interest rate channel unambiguously implies that global aging induces greater dispersion
of net foreign asset positions between theH and theL countries, with a stronger divergence
when ω < 1. The direct effect, which works through a change in demographic composition,
goes in the opposite direction: lower fertility implies a smaller share of young in the pop-
ulation, and thus lower weight on their borrowing. Since the borrowing of the young is
higher in theH country (where credit constraints are less tight), the change in demographic
composition increases savings more in that country. A sufficient condition (although not
necessary) for the interest rate channel to dominate is that the elasticity of the world in-
terest rate to fertility, ηn, is above unity. In this configuration, lower fertility implies more
dispersion in the steady-state net foreign asset position (as a fraction of GDP) between the
high- and low-θ country — i.e., a fall in fertility leads to increased capital flows from the L
to the H country.12
When it is driven by a rise in longevity, p, global aging unambiguously leads to an in-
crease in capital flows from the L to the H country. In this case, the direct effect and the
interest rate channel both work in the same direction. The interest rate channel operates in
a similar way, and is stronger when the interest rate response measured by
∣∣ηp∣∣ is larger.
The direct effect of the increase in the probability of survival to old age, p, is to increase
the propensity to save of the middle-aged, which increases national savings more in the L
country (where a smaller fraction of middle-age labor income is spent on debt repayment),
leading to further divergence in net foreign assets across countries.
Thus, if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low enough, global aging triggers
an increase in capital flows from a low-θ to a high-θ country. This is illustrated in Figure
2.2, where, for realistic parameters values, we plot the transition dynamics of net foreign
12Note that if ω = 1 and the average level of taxes τ is not too large, then ηn ≈ 1. In this knife-edge case, the
dispersion in net foreign assets is left unchanged when fertility changes, as the interest rate and composition
channels perfectly offset each other.
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Figure 2.2: Global Aging and NFA with Heterogenous Credit Constraints
Notes: Parameter values are ω = 1/2, β = 0.975 (annual basis), α = 0.3, θH = 0.15, θL = 0.015, and ε = 0.8.
Initial integrated steady state is for γA = 1.5% (annual basis), p = 0.4, n = 2, and σ = 0.3, with countries of
equal size. Final steady state is for γA = 1.5%, p = 0.8 and n = 1.1. A period is 25 years.
asset positions for a high-θ and a low-θ country, when between t = 0 and t = 2, global
fertility falls and longevity increases.
Global Aging and Heterogeneity in Social Security. Consider now two countries H and
L differing from the average only in their level of social security contributions τ i, which
are such that τL < τ < τH . Corollary 3 implies that in steady state, country L is a creditor,
while country H is a debtor. Using (19), the steady-state difference in net foreign asset
positions relative to GDP across the two countries can be expressed as:
NFALt
Y Lt
− NFA
H
t
Y Ht
=
p(1− α)(τH − τL)
p+ β−ωR
1−ω
[
1 +
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
]
. (21)
The impact of global aging on capital flows between country H and L is summarized in
the following proposition, under the additional assumption that the elasticity of the con-
tribution rate to aging is identical across countries, i.e., εH = εL = ε.
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Proposition 4. A fall in fertility leads to a larger dispersion of net foreign assets over GDP if ηn ≥
1−ε
ω
. A rise in longevity leads to a larger dispersion of net foreign assets over GDP if |ηp| ≥ 1−εω .
Proof. See Appendix B.
A fall in world fertility leads to increased capital flows from a low-τ to a high-τ country if
ηn is large enough. This is the outcome of three distinct forces: the direct effect, the interest
rate channel, and the contribution rate channel. The direct effect, working through a change in
demographic composition, and the interest rate channel, are similar as before — the latter
boosting, the former limiting capital flows from the low-τ to the high-τ country. However,
due to the cross-country heterogeneity in social security, a new channel operates, through
the adjustment of contribution rates: lower fertility requires an increase in contribution
rates, which reduces savings more in a high-τ country, and therefore reinforces the capital
flows from the low-τ to the high-τ country.
An increase in world longevity also leads to increased capital flows from a low-τ to a
high-τ country, provided |ηp| is large enough. As before, the interest rate channel induces
a greater increase in net national savings in the low-τ country. The contribution rate chan-
nel plays in the same direction: higher longevity increases contribution rates more in the
high-τ country, implying further divergence of national savings across countries, and an
even larger dispersion of net foreign assets. Finally, the direct effect of higher longevity
increases savings due to two forces. First, as before, individuals save more, as their prob-
ability of survival to old age is higher; this effect is larger in the low-τ country. Second,
higher longevity reduces the present value of future social security benefits, and this effect
is stronger in the high-τ country, partially offsetting the previous forces.
It is worth noting that the value of ε, the elasticity of the contribution rate to demo-
graphic variables, affects the impact of global aging on the dispersion of net foreign assets.
The effect is ambiguous in general: a higher value of ε limits the response of the world
interest rate to world aging (i.e., ηn and
∣∣ηp∣∣ are lower), which dampens the interest rate
channel; but it also makes the contribution rate channel stronger, as the contribution rates
react more to aging. For realistic parameter values, the latter effect typically dominates,
and a higher tax elasticity amplifies the impact of global aging on capital flows.
In sum, if the the response of the world interest rate to global aging is large enough,
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Figure 2.3: Global Aging and NFA with Heterogenous Social Security
Notes: Parameter values are ω = 1/2, β = 0.975 (annual basis), α = 0.3, θ = 0.05, and ε = 0.8. Initial
integrated steady state is for γA = 1.5% (annual basis), p = 0.4, n = 2, and initial replacement rates σH = 0.5
and σL = 0.1, with countries of equal size. Final steady state is for γA = 1.5%, p = 0.8 and n = 1.1. A period
is 25 years.
global aging triggers an increase in capital flows from low to high social security countries.
Figure 2.3 illustrates this effect in the transition. The figure depicts, for realistic parameters
values, the evolution of current account balances between a low-τ and a high-τ country
when between t = 0 and t = 2, fertility falls and longevity increases globally.
2.2.2 Country-Specific Aging and Capital Flows
We now turn our attention to the effects of country-specific demographic patterns on cap-
ital flows — i.e., we analyze how a country’s net foreign asset position is affected by its
own demographic characteristics. In particular, our goal here is to characterize the net for-
eign asset position (and the dynamics thereof) of a country whose demographic evolutions
deviate from the global trend. We consider a small country, such that changes in its de-
mographic characteristics do not affect the world interest rate. Furthermore, we assume
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that the world interest rate is at its steady state, R, reflecting (see Equation (18)) the aver-
age ease of borrowing and the average level of social security worldwide, (θ, τ), as well as
demographic and productivity growth parameters (p, n, γA) common across the rest of the
world.13 In this case, the net foreign asset position of the small open country (indexed by i)
in period t is given by:
NFAit
Y it
=
pit(1− τ it − θit−1)
pit + β
−ωR
1−ω (1− α)
− n
i
t(1 + γ
i
A,t+1)
R
[
α + (1− α)
(
θit +
β−ωR
1−ω
pit + β
−ωR
1−ω τ
i
t+1
)]
, (22)
Differentiating with respect to fertility nit and longevity pit yields:
∂
∂nit
NFAit
Y it
= − (1+γ
i
A,t+1)
R
[
α + (1− α)
(
θit +
β−ωR1−ω
pt+β−ωR
1−ω τ it+1(1− εit+1)
)]
< 0, (23)
and
∂
∂pit
NFAit
Y it
=
(1− α)β−ωR1−ω
pit + β
−ωR
1−ω × 1− τ it − θit−1
pit + β
−ωR
1−ω +
nit(1 + γ
i
A,t+1)
R
τ it+1
(1− εit+1)pit − εit+1β−ωR1−ω
pit
(
pit + β
−ωR
1−ω)
 , (24)
where εit+1 ≡ ∂τ
i
t+1/τ
i
t+1
∂pit/p
i
t
= −∂τ it+1/τ it+1
∂nit/n
i
t
captures the adjustment of the contribution rate τ it+1
to demographic changes affecting the old dependency ratio in period t + 1. Both a fall
in fertility and an increase in longevity operate via a direct effect and an indirect effect,
working through the contribution rate. The direct effect in either case leads to an increase
in the country’s net foreign asset position, while the contribution rate channel goes in the
opposite direction. In the case of a drop in fertility, under the reasonable assumption that
εit+1 ∈ [0, 1], one can see from (23) that the positive direct effect dominates the negative ef-
fect due to the adjustment of the contribution rate, and thus the net foreign asset position of
the country (expressed as a fraction of GDP) unambiguously increases. The effect of a rise
in longevity, however, is ambiguous in general. From (24), one can see that the smaller is
13In the long run, fertility and productivity growth in country i are such that limt→∞ nit(1 + γiA,t+1) ≤
n(1 + γA). This guarantees that the country does not become too large and affect the world interest rate.
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the contribution rate, τ it+1, and/or its elasticity, εit+1, the more likely it is that the direct effect
dominates the effect of the contribution rate adjustment.14 In other words, the net foreign
asset position should improve less when the rise in longevity occurs in countries with more
developed social security, and/or which are more reluctant to decrease their replacement
rates. As far as emerging countries are concerned, given that their social security systems
are typically less developed (notably in terms of coverage), our analysis suggests that they
are likely to experience an improvement of their net foreign asset positions and to export
capital when their fertility (resp., longevity) drops (resp., rises) faster than in the rest of the
world.
Finally, countries where productivity grows at a faster pace than in the rest of the world
tend to have lower net foreign asset positions and tend to import capital (the impact of a
temporary shock on productivity growth γiA,t+1 can be seen from Equation (22)). However,
if the countries which experience faster productivity growth are also the ones aging faster,
they may well be (or soon turn into) capital exporters.
Illustrative Example: Demographic Convergence in a Small Open Economy. Having es-
tablished that a typical small emerging economy, when it ages faster than the global econ-
omy, tends to become a capital exporter, we now explore in more details how the speed of
demographic convergence towards developed countries affects its net foreign asset posi-
tion and current account dynamics.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the response of capital flows to aging in a small emerging economy.
The emerging country (SOE) is characterized by credit constraints which are constant over
time and tighter than in the rest of the world, so that θSOE < θ. Social security contribution
rates are also significantly lower, so that τSOEt < τ for all t. We abstract from productivity
growth differentials and assume that productivity grows at the same constant rate γA in
the SOE as in the rest of the world. The small emerging economy starts from an initial
autarky steady state and integrates to the world economy at date t = 0. While the world
economy and the SOE are both aging, the emerging country is initially characterized by a
younger population, pt < pt and nt > nt. Over time, the demographic patterns of the SOE
converge to those of the rest of the world. Panel (a) of Figure 2.4 corresponds to a case of
fast demographic convergence, while panel (b) corresponds to a case where convergence is
14In the limit as τ it+1 or εit+1 goes to 0, the direct effect clearly dominates.
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(a) Early Demographic Transition in SOE
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Figure 2.4: Impact of Country-Specific Aging in a Small Open Emerging Economy
Notes: The small open economy (SOE, dashed line) integrates to the rest of the world (RoW, solid line) at
time 0. The exogenous evolution of fertility and longevity for the SOE and the RoW is represented in the first
two subplots in the top row of each panel. Parameter values are ω = 1/2, β = 0.975, γA = 1.5% (both on an
annual basis), α = 0.3. The world is characterized by θ = 0.15, initial replacement rate σ−1 = 0.35, and final
replacement rate σ6 = 0.3174. The small open emerging economy is characterized by θ = 0.015, σ−1 = 0.05,
and σ6 = 0.0362. A period is 25 years.
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slower. To understand the dynamics of the SOE’s net foreign assets under the two scenar-
ios, it is informative to consider the bottom-right corner of each panel, which depicts the
savings-to-GDP (solid line) and the investment-to-GDP (dashed line) in the small emerg-
ing economy. Independently of the pace of demographic convergence, the SOE’s saving
and investment rates increase at the time it integrates to the world economy. However, the
speed of convergence makes a difference for the relative magnitude of the increase in sav-
ings and investment. When demographic convergence is faster, savings increase faster than
investment, leading the SOE to export capital initially. On the contrary, with a slower de-
mographic convergence, the small emerging country initially borrows from the rest of the
world: investment increases more as fertility is expected to stay higher for longer, while
savings rise slowly — as both the composition effect of a fall in fertility (i.e., less young
borrowers relative to middle-aged savers), and the direct effect of longevity on the middle-
aged’s propensity to save, kick-in at a slower pace.
3 Quantitative Analysis
We now turn to the quantitative part of the analysis, where we assess the ability of our
theory to account for the evolution of savings as well as patterns of capital flows across
the world over the last decades. Our quantitative framework enriches the simple model of
Section 2 along several dimensions. We start with a brief description of the setup before
presenting our calibration procedure and discussing the quantitative performance of the
model.
3.1 Multi-Period OLG Model
Countries are populated with agents whose economic life runs for at most J¯ + 1 periods.
Age is indexed by j = 0, ..., J¯ . We denote by pij,t the conditional probability in country i
that an agent of age j in period t survives into the next period (by construction, pi
J¯ ,t
= 0
for all i and t). Let Lij,t denote the number of agents who reach age j in period t. Taking
mortality into account, this number is related to the size of the youngest cohort in period
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t− j by15
Lij,t =
(
j−1∏
`=0
pi`,t−j+`
)
Li0,t−j, 0 ≤ j ≤ J¯ . (25)
The size of the youngest cohort itself evolves as Li0,t+1 = (1 + γiL,t+1)L
i
0,t.
Preferences. Let cij,t denote the consumption of an agent of age j in period t in country i.
The lifetime expected utility of this agent is
U it =
J¯∑
j=0
(
j−1∏
`=0
pi`,t+`
)
βju(cij,t+j), (26)
with standard isoelastic preferences u(c) = (c1−
1
ω − 1)/(1− 1
ω
).
Production. Agents work until period J of their life, after which they retire. Gross output
in country i is
Y it = (K
i
t)
α
[
Ait
J∑
j=0
eij,tL
i
j,t
]1−α
= AitLˆ
i
t(k
i
t)
α, (27)
where Lˆit ≡
∑J
j=0 e
i
j,tL
i
j,t denotes the total efficiency-weighted population, and kit = Kit/(AitLˆit)
denotes the capital-effective-labor ratio. The set of efficiency weights {eij,t}Jj=0 captures the
shape of the age-income profile in period t and country i. Indeed, the labor income received
by an agent of age j in country i in period t is
wij,t = e
i
j,tw
i
t, (28)
where wit ≡ (1− α)Ait(kit)α. Finally, the gross rate of return between t− 1 and t is
Rit = 1− δ + α(kit)α−1, (29)
where δ denotes the depreciation rate of capital over one period.
Social Security. Social security contributions are levied on labor income, at a flat rate τ it .
15We adopt the convention
∏−1
`=0 p
i
`,t+` = 1.
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The pension transfer received by a retiree of age j = J + 1, . . . , J¯ in period t is
piij,t = σ
i
tw
i
J,t−j+J , (30)
where σit denotes the replacement rate in that period. For the social security system to be
balanced in every period, the paths of contribution and replacement rates must be such
that
τ it
J∑
j=0
Lij,tw
i
j,t =
J¯∑
j=J+1
Lij,tpi
i
j,t = σ
i
t
J¯∑
j=J+1
Lij,tw
i
J,t−j+J . (31)
Unintentional Bequests. Let aij,t denote the end-of-period net asset holdings of an agent
of age j in period t. The total net wealth of agents who die at the end of period t in country
i is
Qit ≡
J¯−1∑
j=0
(1− pij,t)Lij,taij,t. (32)
Unintentional bequests are redistributed as lump-sum transfers to all agents of age j ∈ B
who survive into the next period.16 Hence the amount of wealth transfer received by a
surviving agent of age j < J¯ at the end of period t is
qij,t =
 0 j /∈ BQit∑
j∈B p
i
j,tL
i
j,t
=: qit, j ∈ B.
(33)
Household Constraints. Consider the consumption-saving problem of an agent born in
period t and country i. This agent faces a (potential) sequence of gross rates of return
{Rit+j+1}J¯−1j=0 , labor income {wij,t+j}Jj=0, pension transfers {piij,t+j}J¯j=J+1, and bequest transfers
{qij,t+j}J¯−1j=0 . Flow budget constraints are
cij,t+j + a
i
j,t+j = R
i
t+j(a
i
j−1,t+j−1 + q
i
j−1,t+j−1) + (1− τ it )wij,t, 0 ≤ j ≤ J, (34)
cij,t+j + a
i
j,t+j = R
i
t+j(a
i
j−1,t+j−1 + q
i
j−1,t+j−1) + pi
i
j,t, J + 1 ≤ j ≤ J¯ , (35)
16Note that when an agent dies without having fully repaid his debt, the loan is effectively repaid by the
“heirs”.
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with ai−1,t−1 = qi−1,t−1 = 0. Define the expected discounted present value of current and
future labor income for an agent who reaches age j in period t
H ij,t ≡ wij,t +
J−j∑
τ=1
(∏τ−1
s=0 p
i
j+s,t+s
)
wij+τ,t+τ∏τ
s=1R
i
t+s
, 0 ≤ j ≤ J − 1, (36)
H iJ,t ≡ wiJ,t (37)
H ij,t ≡ 0, j ≥ J + 1. (38)
The credit constraint faced at age j ≤ J¯ − 1 by an agent born in period t in country i is
aij,t+j ≥ −θi
pij,t+jH
i
j+1,t+j+1
Rit+j+1
. (39)
Equilibrium. We solve for the autarkic and integrated steady states of the model, as well
as its transitory dynamics for a given evolution of productivity, demographics, and social
security contribution rates. In autarky, the model equilibrium is given by a path for the
capital-effective-labor ratio kit, bequest transfers
{
qij,t
}J¯−1
j=0
, and replacement rates σit such
that: (i) all agents maximize their intertemporal utility (Eq. 26) with respect to their con-
sumption decisions, subject to the sequence of budget constraints (Eqs. 34-35) and credit
constraints (Eq. 39); (ii) the consistency condition (Eq. 33) between the bequest transfers
and the amount of unintentional bequests left is satisfied; (iii) the social security budget is
balanced (Eq. 31); and (iv) the market for capital clears in every period. Under financial
integration, a similar definition of an equilibrium holds, with the market for capital clear-
ing globally. When solving for equilibrium, the presence of bequests and social security
transfers adds layers of complexity as the paths of capital, bequests and replacement rates
have to be determined together in a dynamic fixed point problem. A detailed description
of the numerical solution method is provided in Appendix C.
3.2 Calibration
In our experiments, the world consists of multiple groups of countries (regions), as defined
in Appendix A.1. For illustrative purposes, we start our simulations with two groups of
countries, Developed and Emerging, and extend progressively the number of regions. Each
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period lasts for 10 years and agents live for (at most) 7 periods — which map into age
brackets 20-30, 30-40, ... , 70-80, and above 80. Agents work during four periods and are
retired in the last three periods of their life. All regions start from their initial autarky
steady state in 1950 and stay in autarky until 1980, date at which capital can freely move
across regions. We now turn to the calibration of common and region-specific parameters.
The values of calibrated parameters are summarized in Table 1.
Preferences and Technology. We set the discount factor β to 0.985 annually and the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution ω to 1/2 — in the mid-range of empirical estimates. The
capital share α is set to 0.3 and the depreciation rate of capital to 7.5% (on annual basis).
Demographics. In the initial autarky steady state of region i, the survival probabilities, pij ,
are set to match the demographic composition by age groups of the region in 1950, given
an initial steady-state population growth γiL calibrated over the period 1920-1950. Note
that the obtained survival probabilities are fairly close to the ones estimated by the United
Nations (World Population Prospects) in 1950. For years 1960, 1970, ..., 2010, the growth
rate of the size of the youngest age group γiL,t and the survival probabilities p
i
j,t ∈ [0, 1] are
chosen to match the growth rate of the population and its composition by age group.17 For
the years post-2010, we proceed similarly but we match population forecasts by the United
Nations for those years, based on their medium scenario. After 2100, survival probabilities
in a region are held constant to their 2100 value and demographic growth γiL,t is set to zero
in all countries.
Age-income Profiles and Distribution of Unintentional Bequests. The relative efficiency
parameters, eij , are set to match the wage-income profile (net of income taxes) of the U.S.,
based on income data by age groups from the Consumption Expenditure Survey (CEX) for
the year 2008 (normalizing to 1 the efficiency parameter of the 40-50 age group). Note that
the age-income profile is very stable over time in the U.S. for the period of availability of
the CEX (1986-2008) and results are not sensitive to the choice of the year 2008. However,
it is likely that age-income profiles differ across countries (see Coeurdacier, Guibaud, and
Jin (2015) for a U.S.-China comparison) but due to the lack of individual income data for
17With pij,t ∈ [0, 1] one cannot match the demographic data perfectly due to potential migration but our
predicted demographic compositions are very close to the true ones and our survival probabilities are also
very close to the ones estimated by the United Nations.
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Table 1: Calibration Summary
Age-income profiles, ej,t
20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70+
All regions All periods 0.33 0.75 1 0.75 0.05 0
Conditional survival probabilities, pj,t, percent
20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70-80
Developed 1960 99.4 98.0 94.2 86.2 68.2 43.6
2010 100 100 100 90.5 82.0 58.8
Emerging 1960 93.7 91.6 86.1 74.7 53.5 28.9
2010 97.6 96.7 94.4 87.4 71.6 44.6
South-East Asia 1960 94.7 92.6 86.4 74.2 51.2 22.8
2010 98.9 98.2 96.3 89.9 74.8 45.3
Rest of Emerging 1960 93.1 90.6 84.9 73.6 54.1 30.7
2010 97.5 96.0 94.1 84.5 66.3 39.5
U.S. 1960 99.4 98.0 94.2 86.2 68.2 43.6
2010 100 100 100 90.5 82.0 58.8
Europe 1960 100 98.8 94.6 87.1 68.8 41.1
2010 100 100 100 94.9 87.3 65.8
Demographic growth, γL,t, percent per year
D E SEA RoE U.S. Eu
1950-60 0.2 1.8 1.9 1.6 0.2 0.5
2000-10 0.3 1.6 0.9 2.1 0.3 -0.8
Productivity growth, γA,t, percent per year
D E SEA RoE US Eu
1950-60 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 4.0
1960-70 2.5 2.5 3.0 1.5 2.5 3.5
1970-80 1.5 2.5 3.0 2.0 1.5 1.8
1980-90 1.5 2.5 3.0 2.3 1.5 1.3
1990-00 2.0 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.0
2000-10 2.0 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.0
2010-20 1.5 2.0 2.3 2.5 1.5 1.0
Credit constraint, θ, percent
D E SEA RoE U.S. Eu
All periods 15.0 1.8 2.5 1.4 19.1 13.5
Social security contribution rate, τt, percent
D E SEA RoE U.S. Eu
1950 10.22 1.27 1.71 1.20 8.18 12.72
2010 13.19 1.74 2.22 1.67 9.63 23.21
Other parameters
Discount factor, β, per year 0.985 E.i.s. coefficient, ω 0.5
Depreciation rate, δ, per year 0.075 Capital share, α 0.3
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a large sample of countries, we assume that all countries share common relative efficiency
parameters.
For now, we assume that unintentional bequests are distributed evenly across individ-
uals in their working age, reflecting bequests towards children (and potentially grand-
children). Results are barely sensitive to different redistribution schemes of bequests.
Heterogeneity in Credit Constraints [Preliminary]. We use household debt over GDP
data to calibrate the (time-invariant) region-specific credit constraint parameters. As data
on household debt across countries are scarce and missing for many emerging countries
in our sample, we compute forecasts of household debt over GDP for each country using
variables correlated with household debt and observed for a large cross-section of coun-
tries in 2011 (such as the fraction of the population above the age of 15 with a mortgage,
and the same fraction with a credit card), where the forecasting equation is estimated on
a sample of countries for which household debt over GDP is observed in 2010.18 Using
observed and predicted household debt over GDP, credit constraints parameters across re-
gions are set such that for a given region i, the ratio θi/θD matches the ratio of household
debt between the region i and the group of developed countries (D) in 2010.19 The remain-
ing free parameter θD is set to match aggregate savings in the group of developed countries
(D) in 2010.20 Note that estimated differences in the level of financial development across
countries are fairly large, with a θ about 5 to 10 times smaller in emerging countries than
in developed countries (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A).
Heterogeneity in Social Security [Preliminary]. Data on contribution and replacement
rates of pay-as-you-go systems are available for OECD countries over the period 1990-
2010, and for a large sample of emerging countries over the period 2002-2010. A major
issue is the extent of coverage of social security programs. In emerging countries, most
workers do not contribute and do not qualify for any benefits. In our framework, this
would translate into lower contribution and replacement rates. To adjust for coverage, we
18Household debt over GDP in 2010 is observed for 36 countries. Both predicting variables are significant
and the R2 of the forecasting equation is 0.88. Forecasting equations with alternative predictors correlated
with the development of credit markets give very similar measures of household debt. The dispersion of
household debt over GDP as predicted by our baseline regression is shown in Figure A.1 (Appendix A.3).
19The household debt over GDP of a given region is the population-weighted average of the different
countries in the region.
20The value obtained is close to the one estimated for the U.S. in Coeurdacier, Guibaud, and Jin (2015).
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use data from the World Social Security Report 2010/11 (ILO) for one large cross-section
of countries. As shown in Figure A.2 in Appendix A, large disparities in coverage exist
across countries; in low income countries less than 20% of the population is covered by
social security schemes compared to about 90% in the most developed countries. In the
most recent period, the effective replacement rate is thus an order of magnitude smaller
in emerging countries, and most likely even more so in earlier periods. At this stage, we
target an effective replacement rate of about 10% in emerging countries — corresponding
to a replacement rate of 50% and a coverage of 20%. For developed countries, we target
the effective replacement rate in 2010. In the time-series dimension, starting in 1950, we
set a path of taxes such that the replacement rates in developed countries exhibit a small
downward trend — assuming that by 2040, 70% of the adjustment in the financing of social
security due to aging is done through higher contribution rates. For emerging countries,
the path of taxes is set so as to maintain replacement rates at their 2010 level over the entire
period. [The calibration is illustrative at this stage but note that our results are mostly
sensitive to cross-sectional differences.]
Initial Size and Productivity Growth. In 1950, the initial relative size of all regions is set to
match their relative share in world GDP. Over the period 1950-2010, given demographics
and other structural parameters, world productivity growth is set to match the evolution of
world GDP (at constant 1990 USD), and the productivity growth rate in a region (relative
to the world) is set to match the share of the region in world GDP. Post 2030, all regions
share a common productivity growth rate of 1.5% annually, towards which productivity
growth in each region converges in two decades.
3.3 Results
Developed vs. Emerging. We start with a two-region version of our quantitative model,
the world being divided between developed and emerging countries (see Appendix A.1
for a list of countries in each region). Emerging countries are characterized by significantly
tighter credit constraints and lower replacement rates, as well as a much younger popula-
tion initially and faster productivity growth post-1970.
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the variables of interest in our baseline two-region
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Figure 3.1: Capital Flows Between a Developed and an Emerging Region
Notes: The young-old ratio corresponds to the ratio of the size of the group of agents of age j = 1, 2 (i.e.,
20-40) over the size of the group of agents of age j = 5, 6, 7 (i.e., 60-90). The values of calibrated parameters
are given in Table 1.
experiment. Emerging countries initially run a small current account deficit in the 1980s
before slowly starting to run a surplus as they converge to the developed countries in
terms of demographics. This initial current account deficit is driven by faster growth and
a younger population initially. In a simulation where productivity growth is equal across
regions, emerging countries accumulate net foreign assets as soon as they open up (see
Figure D.1 in Appendix D). Aging in both regions triggers a fall in the world interest rate,
amplified by the increasing size of emerging countries which have tighter credit constraints
and lower replacement rates. Falling interest rates trigger a savings divergence between
emerging and developed countries. The contribution rates have to increase in developed
countries to maintain the financing of the pension system, which exerts further downward
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pressure on their savings. The increase in savings in emerging countries eventually outpace
their higher investment rates, driven by faster growth, turning these countries into world
creditors. They remain creditors as long as the initial differences in credit markets and
social security coverage persist.
Figure 3.2 shows the importance of the asymmetry between regions in the ability to bor-
row — intertemporally and across generations — for the dynamics of savings and capital
flows. With homogenous credit constraints and replacement rates, set to the level in devel-
oped countries, the model predicts low savings and very large current account deficits in
emerging countries for over forty years after integration.
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Figure 3.2: Capital Flows Between a Developed and an Emerging Region, Identical τ and θ
Notes: The young-old ratio corresponds to the ratio of the size of the group of agents of age j = 1, 2 (i.e.,
20-40) over the size of the group of agents of age j = 5, 6, 7 (i.e., 60-90). The values of calibrated parameters
are given in Table 1.
Three Regions. We now turn to our second main experiment, which takes into account
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Figure 3.3: Capital Flows Between a Developed and Two Emerging Regions
Notes: The young-old ratio corresponds to the ratio of the size of the group of agents of age j = 1, 2 (i.e.,
20-40) over the size of the group of agents of age j = 5, 6, 7 (i.e., 60-90). The values of calibrated parameters
are given in Table 1.
some heterogeneity among emerging countries. We split emerging countries into two re-
gions: South-East Asia (SEA) and a large region including South-Central Asia, the Middle
East and Northern Africa, which we refer to as rest of emerging (RoE).21 The former is
characterized by faster productivity growth (starting from 1970) and faster aging, while
the latter experienced slower growth and a delayed demographic transition. Both regions
have similar credit constraints and replacement rates.
Faster growth in South-East Asia together with the small initial differences in demo-
graphics triggers larger capital flows towards this region initially, but the pattern quickly
21The region including South-Central Asia, the Middle East and Northern Africa had a slightly slower
demographic transition than Latin America but significantly faster than the rest of Africa (see Figure 1.1,
panels (c) and (d)). A region made of all emerging countries but South-East Asia exhibits a very similar
demographic evolution.
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reverses (Figure 3.3). Due to a delayed demographic transition and despite slower pro-
ductivity growth, the RoE region turns into the major world borrower in the 1990s. Faster
aging in South-East Asia turns the region into a creditor in the most recent period. At
the date of integration, developed countries are financing faster growth in both emerging
regions, whether due to demographics or productivity, before slowly turning into debtors.
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Figure 3.4: Capital Flows Between Two Developed and Two Emerging Regions
Notes: The young-old ratio corresponds to the ratio of the size of the group of agents of age j = 1, 2 (i.e.,
20-40) over the size of the group of agents of age j = 5, 6, 7 (i.e., 60-90). The values of calibrated parameters
are given in Table 1.
Four Regions. Our last experiment takes into account some heterogeneity among devel-
oped countries as well. We consider a region comprising the U.S. and other Anglo-saxon
countries (which we refer to as U.S.), with more developed credit markets, and another re-
gion comprising continental Western Europe and Japan (which we refer to as Europe (Eu)),
with more generous social security systems. This latter region is also aging more than the
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U.S. and their productivity stagnates after 1990.
As a consequence, due to depressed investment, Europe is the major world creditor
until the most recent period, where it is replaced by South-East Asia (see Figure 3.4). Inter-
estingly, Europe is expected to become a debtor in the near future as the financing of social
security and the larger share of elderly in the population starts to lower their savings. On
the other hand, the U.S., being slightly younger and growing faster than the rest of the
developed countries, imports capital over the entire period. For the two emerging regions,
results are very similar to those in the previous experiment.
Multiple Countries and the Cross Section of Capital Flows. [TO BE DONE]
3.4 Sensitivity analysis and extensions
[TO BE DONE]
4 Conclusion
[TO BE WRITTEN]
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A Data
A.1 List of Countries
Developed countries.
Western offshoots and Anglo-saxon countries. Australia, Canada, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand,
United Kingdom, United States.
Old Europe and Japan. Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland.
Central and Eastern Europe. Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Ro-
mania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine.
Emerging countries.
South East Asia. Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea Rep., Lao PDR, Macao
SAR, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam.
South and Central Asia. Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Geor-
gia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Tajikistan.
Middle-East and North Africa. Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt Arab Rep., Iran Islamic Rep., Israel,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia,
Turkey, Yemen Rep.
Central and Western Africa. Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Congo Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda.
Southern Africa. Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swazi-
land, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Pacific Islands. Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu.
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A.2 Data sources
Demographics. United Nations World Population Prospects. Maddison Project for popu-
lation data prior to 1950 (Bolt and van Zanden (2014)).
GDP Data. Maddison Project and Penn World Tables.
Data on Savings, Investment, and Current Account. World Development Indicators (World
Bank), Penn World Tables and OECD.
Data on Net Foreign Asset Positions. External Wealth of Nations Dataset, 1970-2011 (Lane
and Milesi Feretti (2007)).
Data on Social Security. OECD and Social Security Administration (Social Security Pro-
grams Throughout the World in collaboration with the International Social Security Asso-
ciation). Coverage data are from the International Labour Organization (Social Security
Department), latest available year.
Household Debt Data. Global Financial Inclusion Database (World Bank), OECD, GFDD
(World Bank).
A.3 Household Debt and Social Security across the World
Fig A.1 below shows the level of household debt over GDP across regions in 2010. For
each region, the household debt over GDP is the population-weighted average of coun-
tries household debt over GDP (with 2010 population-weights). As household debt is not
observable for most developing countries, we use a forecasted value when missing. Our
predicted household debt over GDP is a linear combination of two explanatory variables —
percentage of individuals above 15 with a mortgage and percentage of individuals above 15
with a credit card in 2011 (from the Global Financial Inclusion Database, World Bank). The
coefficients in the forecasting equation are estimated using a linear regression on OECD
countries for which household debt over GDP in 2010 is observed (both coefficients sig-
nificant at 5% with an R2 of 88%). Fig A.2 shows the level of official replacement rates of
paygo systems as well as the coverage of the system across regions in 2010. Two measures
of coverage from ILO are used (latest available year between 2002-2008): the percentage
of active contributors in percentage of the working age population and the percentage of
pension recipients in old age population (60+ or 65+ according to retirement age). For each
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region, the replacement rate and the measures of coverage are the population-weighted
average across countries (with 2010 population-weights).
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Figure A.1: Household Debt to GDP across the World.
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B Proofs
Condition for a Binding Credit Constraint in the Three-Period Model of Section 2.
The borrowing constraint is binding if the young without any borrowing constraints would
prefer to consume more than what the borrowing constraint allows them to consume, i.e.
θt−1wt/Rt < c∗y,t−1. Solving the household’s problem, this condition can be expressed as:
θt−1 <
1− τt + ptσt+1Rt+1
1 + βωRω−1t + ptβ2ω(RtRt+1)ω−1
.
For ω = 1, this simplifies to: θt−1 < 11+β+β2pt
(
1− τt + ptσt+1Rt+1
)
.
Note that the condition does not only entail parameters of the model, but also Rt and
Rt+1, which are endogenous, and hence depend on the values of θt−1, τt, σt+1, pt and β. We
assume that θt−1 and τt are jointly such that this condition is satisfied. For a given θt−1, we
will later denote by τy the maximum value of τ which satisfies this condition in the steady
state.
Note also that if the borrowing constraint is binding, then the net income of the middle
aged (after taxes and repayment of debt accumulated when young) is wt(1 − θt−1 − τt). If
θt−1 > 1 − τt, then the middle aged cannot accumulate any savings, and the model would
not have a solution in the autarky case. Therefore we also assume that θt−1 < 1− τt.
Proof of Proposition 1. Re-arranging (10) and using the fact that all parameters are con-
stant, we get:
Rt+1 =
(
kt+1
kt
)α
n(1 + γA)
p(1− τ − θ)
(
p+ β−ωR1−ωt+1
)( α
1− α + θ +
β−ωR1−ωt+1
p+ β−ωR1−ωt+1
τ
)
=
(
kt+1
kt
)α
n(1 + γA)
p(1− τ − θ)
[(
p+ β−ωR1−ωt+1
)( α
1− α + θ
)
+
(
p+ β−ωR1−ωt+1
) β−ωR1−ωt+1
p+ β−ωR1−ωt+1
τ
]
=
(
kt+1
kt
)α
n(1 + γA)
p(1− τ − θ)
[
p
(
α
1− α + θ
)
+ β−ωR1−ωt+1
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)]
.
Re-arranging further yields
(
kt
kt+1
)α
=
n(1 + γA)
p(1− τ − θ)
[
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
Rt+1
+
β−ω
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
Rωt+1
]
. (B-1)
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Existence and uniqueness. If a steady state k and henceR exist, they have to satisfy the above
equation for kt = kt+1 and Rt+1 = R:
1 =
n(1 + γA)
p(1− τ − θ)
[
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
R
+
β−ω
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
Rω
]
(B-2)
The above clearly has a unique solution in terms of R as long τ < 1− θ. The left hand side
is constant, while the right hand side is decreasing in R. In the limit as R → 0, the right
hand side converges to∞, while as R→∞, the right hand side converges to 0.
Convergence. We now have to show that the economy converges to the above defined k
and R from any initial kt. Without loss of generality consider kt < k. We need to show
that a kt+1 and hence Rt+1, which satisfies (B-1), is necessarily such that kt < kt+1 < k. We
proceed by showing that neither kt+1 < kt, nor kt+1 > k cannot satisfy (B-1).
Consider first a kt+1 < kt < k. In this case Rt+1 > R, and hence the right hand side of (B-1)
is smaller than 1. However, the left hand side of (B-1) is larger than 1.
Now consider a kt+1 > k > kt. In this case Rt+1 < R, and hence the right hand side of (B-1)
is larger than 1. However, the left hand side is now smaller than 1.
Comparative statics. Multiplying (B-2) by R we get
R =
n(1 + γA)
p(1− τ − θ)
[
p
(
α
1− α + θ
)
+ β−ωR1−ω
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)]
,
which is exactly (11) as stated in the Proposition. Taking derivatives of (11) with respect to
τ :
∂R
∂τ
=
n(1 + γA)β
−ωR1−ω
p(1− θ − τ) +
n(1 + γA)
[
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ β−ωR1−ω
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)]
(p(1− θ − τ))2 p
+
n(1 + γA)(1− ω)β−ωR−ω
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
p(1− θ − τ)
∂R
∂τ
=
n(1 + γA)β
−ωR1−ω
p(1− θ − τ) +
R
1− θ − τ
+
(1− ω)β−ωR1−ω ( α
1−α + θ + τ
)
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ β−ωR1−ω
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
) ∂R
∂τ
∂R
∂τ
=
1
1− (1− ω) β−ωR1−ω(
α
1−α+θ+τ)
p( α1−α+θ)+β−ωR1−ω(
α
1−α+θ+τ)
[
n(1 + γA)β
−ωR1−ω
p(1− θ − τ) +
R
1− θ − τ
]
.
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Since (1− ω) β
−ωR1−ω( α1−α+θ+τ)
p( α1−α+θ)+β−ωR1−ω(
α
1−α+θ+τ)
< 1, ∂R
∂τ
≥ 0.
Similarly taking the derivative with respect to θ and re-arranging we get:
∂R
∂θ
=
1
1− (1− ω) β−ωR1−ω(
α
1−α+θ+τ)
p( α1−α+θ)+β−ωR1−ω(
α
1−α+θ+τ)
[
n(1 + γA)β
−ωR1−ω
p(1− τ − θ) +
R
(1− τ − θ)
]
. (B-3)
implying that ∂R
∂θ
≥ 0.
Proof of Corollary 1. Plug τ = 0 into (11) to get
R0 =
n(1 + γA)
p(1− θ)
(
α
1− α + θ
)(
p+ β−ωR1−ω0
)
,
which is the equation pinning down R0 given in the Corollary. Now differentiate with
respect to n:
∂R0
∂n
=
R0
n
+
n(1 + γA)
(
α
1−α + θ
)
(1− ω)β−ωR−ω0
p (1− θ)
∂R0
∂n
=
R0
n
+ (1− ω) β
−ωR1−ω0
p+ β−ωR1−ω0
∂R0
∂n
,
∂R0
∂n
=
1
1− (1− ω) β−ωR1−ω0
p+β−ωR1−ω0
R0
n
.
Let φ0 ≡ β
−ωR1−ω0
p+β−ωR1−ω0
∈ [0, 1]. The elasticity is then
η0,n ≡ ∂R0/R0
∂n/n
=
1
1− (1− ω) β−ωR1−ω0
p+β−ωR1−ω0
=
1
1− (1− ω)φ0 > 0.
Note that with ω = 1, η0,n = 1.
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Now let’s do the same by differentiating with respect to p:
∂R0
∂p
=
n(1 + γA)
(
α
1−α + θ
)
p(1− θ) −
n(1 + γA)
(
p+ β−ωR1−ω0
) (
α
1−α + θ
)
(1− θ)
p2(1− θ)2
+
n(1 + γA)
(
α
1−α + θ
)
(1− ω)β−ωR−ω0
p (1− θ)
∂R0
∂p
=
n(1 + γA)
(
α
1−α + θ
)
p(1− θ)
(
1−
(
p+ β−ωR1−ω0
)
p
)
+ (1− ω) β
−ωR1−ω0
p+ β−ωR1−ω0
∂R0
∂p
=− n(1 + γA)
(
α
1−α + θ
)
p(1− θ)
β−ωR1−ω0
p
+ (1− ω) β
−ωR1−ω0
p+ β−ωR1−ω0
∂R0
∂p
=− β
−ωR1−ω0
p+ β−ωR1−ω0
R0
p
+ (1− ω) β
−ωR1−ω0
p+ β−ωR1−ω0
∂R0
∂p
= −φ0R0
p
+ (1− ω)φ0∂R0
∂p
∂R0
∂p
=−
β−ωR1−ω0
p+β−ωR1−ω0
1− (1− ω) β−ωR1−ω0
p+β−ωR1−ω0
R0
p
= − φ0
1− (1− ω)φ0
R0
p
< 0.
The elasticity is then:
η0,p ≡ ∂R0/R0
∂p/p
=− φ0
1− (1− ω)φ0 < 0
Again note that with ω = 1, η0,p = − 11+βp .
To characterize how these elasticities behave for different values of ω, first differentiate R0
wrt ω:
∂R0
∂ω
=
n(1 + γA)
(
α
1−α + θ
)
p(1− θ)
[
−β−ωR1−ω0 ln β − β−ωR1−ω0 lnR0 + (1− ω)β−ωR−ω0
∂R0
∂ω
]
= −R0 ln(βR0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 iff βR0>1
β−ωR1−ω0
p+ β−ωR1−ω0
+ (1− ω) β
−ωR1−ω0
p+ β−ωR1−ω0
∂R0
∂ω
∂R0
∂ω
= − 1
1− (1− ω) β−ωR1−ω0
p+β−ωR1−ω0
β−ωR1−ω0
p+ β−ωR1−ω0
R0 ln(βR0) < 0.
The above holds as long as βR0 > 1.
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Now differentiate η0,n wrt ω:
∂η0,n
∂ω
=
∂
(
1− (1− ω) β−ωR1−ω0
p+β−ωR1−ω0
)−1
∂ω
= −
(
1− (1− ω)
(
1− p
p+ β−ωR1−ω0
))−2
·(1− p
p+ β−ωR1−ω0
)
− (1− ω)p(
p+ β−ωR1−ω0
)2
−β−ωR1−ω0 ln(βR0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 iff βR0>1
+(1− ω)β−ωR−ω0
∂R0
∂ω︸︷︷︸
<0


︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0.
Since for ω = 1 the elasticity η0,n = 1, and
∂η0,n
∂ω
< 0, for ω < 1 the elasticity η0,n > 1.
Now differentiate η0,p wrt ω:
∂η0,p
∂ω
=−
∂
[
η0,n
(
1− p
p+β−ωR1−ω0
)]
∂ω
= −
(
1− p
p+ β−ωR1−ω0
)
∂η0,n
∂ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− η0,n p(
p+ β−ωR1−ω0
)2
−β−ωR1−ω0 ln(βR0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 iff βR0>1
+(1− ω)β−ωR−ω0
∂R0
∂ω︸︷︷︸
<0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0.
Since for ω = 1 the elasticity η0,p = − 11+βp , and ∂η0,p∂ω > 0, for ω < 1 the elasticity η0,p < − 11+βp ,
i. e. the elasticity in absolute terms is larger.
To summarize, for x = {n, p} and τ = 0, we get that:
∂ |η0,x|
∂ω
> 0.
Proof of Corollary 2. In general, (11) for τ > 0 is:
Rτ =
n(1 + γA)
p(1− τ − θ)
[
p
(
α
1− α + θ
)
+ β−ωR1−ωτ
(
α
1− α + θ + τ
)]
.
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Differentiating with respect to n:
∂Rτ
∂n
=
Rτ
n
+
n(1 + γA)β
−ωR1−ωτ
p(1− θ − τ)
∂τ
∂n
+
n(1 + γA)
[
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ β−ωR1−ωτ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)]
p2(1− θ − τ)2 p
∂τ
∂n
+ (1− ω) β
−ωR1−ωτ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ β−ωR1−ωτ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
) ∂Rτ
∂n
=
Rτ
n
− n(1 + γA)β
−ωR1−ωτ
p(1− θ − τ) ε
τ
n
− Rτ
1− θ − τ ε
τ
n
+ (1− ω) β
−ωR1−ωτ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ β−ωR1−ωτ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
) ∂Rτ
∂n
=
Rτ
n
(
1− ετ
1− θ − τ
[
1 +
n(1 + γA)β
−ωR−ωτ
p
])
+ (1− ω) β
−ωR1−ωτ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ β−ωR1−ωτ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
) ∂Rτ
∂n
∂Rτ
∂n
=
1
1− (1− ω) β−ωR
1−ω
τ ( α1−α+θ+τ)
p( α1−α+θ)+β−ωR
1−ω
τ ( α1−α+θ+τ)
Rτ
n
(
1− ετ
1− θ − τ
[
1 +
n(1 + γA)β
−ωR−ωτ
p
])
.
Let φτ ≡ β
−ωR1−ωτ ( α1−α+θ+τ)
p( α1−α+θ)+β−ωR
1−ω
τ ( α1−α+θ+τ)
∈ [0, 1]. Using this, the elasticity can be expressed as:
ητ,n ≡∂Rτ/Rτ
∂n/n
=
1
1− (1− ω)φτ
(
1− ετ
1− θ − τ
[
1 +
n(1 + γA)β
−ωR−ωτ
p
])
,
which is positive if and only if
ετ
1− θ − τ
[
1 +
n(1 + γA)β
−ωR−ωτ
p
]
< 1.
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Now let’s do the same analysis for p. First differentiate Rτ wrt p:
∂Rτ
∂p
=
n(1 + γA)
[(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ β−ωR1−ωτ
∂τ
∂p
+ (1− ω)β−ωR−ωτ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
∂Rτ
∂p
]
p(1− θ − τ)
− n(1 + γA)
[
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ β−ωR1−ωτ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)]
(p(1− θ − τ))2
[
(1− θ − τ)− p∂τ
∂p
]
=− β
−ωR1−ωτ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ β−ωR1−ωτ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)Rτ
p
+
[
n(1 + γA)β
−ωR−ωτ
p(1− θ − τ) +
1
(1− θ − τ)
]
Rτ
p
ετ
+ (1− ω) β
−ωR1−ωτ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)[
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ β−ωR1−ωτ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)] ∂Rτ
∂p
∂Rτ
∂p
=
1
1− (1− ω)φτ
Rτ
p
(
−φτ + ετ
1− θ − τ
[
1 +
n(1 + γA)β
−ωR−ωτ
p
])
the elasticity can be expressed as:
ητ,p ≡∂Rτ/Rτ
∂p/p
=
1
1− (1− ω)φτ
(
−φτ + ετ
1− θ − τ
[
1 +
n(1 + γA)β
−ωR−ωτ
p
])
,
which is negative if and only if
ετ
1− θ − τ
[
1 +
n(1 + γA)β
−ωR−ωτ
p
]
< φτ . (B-4)
Note that as φτ ≤ 1, this implies that as long as ητ,p < 0 it necessarily has to hold that
ητ,n > 0.
We can rewrite (B-4) as:
ετ
α
1−α + θ + τ
<
n(1 + γA)β
−ωR−ωτ
p+ n(1 + γA)β−ωR−ωτ
.
If we can show that there exists a τmax such that for any τ < τmax:
τ
α
1−α + θ + τ
<
n(1 + γA)β
−ωR−ωτ
p+ n(1 + γA)β−ωR−ωτ
, (B-5)
then for any τ < τmax it also has to hold that ητ,p < 0 and ηtau,n > 0, as we assumed that
ε ∈ [0, 1].
To show the existence of such a τmax, note that the left hand side of (B-5) is increasing in τ ,
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at τ = 0 its value is 0.
To evaluate the dependence of the right hand side of (B-5) on τ first take the derivative of
Rτ with respect to τ :
∂Rτ
∂τ
=
n(1 + γA)β
−ωR1−ωτ
p(1− θ − τ) +
n(1 + γA)
[
p
(
α
1−α + θ
)
+ β−ωR1−ωτ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)]
(p(1− θ − τ))2 p
+
n(1 + γA)(1− ω)β−ωR−ωτ
(
α
1−α + θ + τ
)
p(1− θ − τ)
∂Rτ
∂τ
=
(
φτ +
1
1− θ − τ
)
Rτ + (1− ω)φτ ∂Rτ
∂τ
∂Rτ
∂τ
=
1
1− (1− ω)φτ
(
φτ +
1
1− θ − τ
)
Rτ > 0,
implying that Rτ is increasing in τ . Since the right hand side of (B-5) is decreasing in Rτ ,
it is immediate that it is also decreasing in τ . At τ = 0 the value of the right hand side
of (B-5) is positive, and hence larger than the value on the left hand side. This together
with the facts that the left hand side is monotone increasing, while the right hand side is
monotone decreasing in τ , implies that there exists a τ˜ > 0 that equalizes the left and the
right hand side of (B-5). Now it is easy to see that for any τ < τmax, where τmax is defined
as τmax ≡ min{1− θ, τ˜ , τy}, the inequality (B-5) holds.
Proof of Proposition 2. INSERT PROOF OF EXISTENCE OF STEADY STATE.
The wealth (asset) holdings in country i in period t are given by:
W it = L
i
y,ta
i
y,t + L
i
m,ta
i
m,t = L
i
m,t
(
nita
i
y,t + a
i
m,t
)
= Lim,t
[
(1− α)p
i
t(1− τ it − θit−1)
pit + β
−ωR1−ωt+1
Aitk
α
t −
1− α
α
(
β−ωR1−ωt+1
pit + β
−ωR1−ωt+1
τ it+1 + θ
i
t
)
nitA
i
t+1kt+1
]
= AitL
i
m,t
[
(1− α)p
i
t(1− τ it − θit−1)
pit + β
−ωR1−ωt+1
kαt −
1− α
α
(
β−ωR1−ωt+1
pit + β
−ωR1−ωt+1
τ it+1 + θ
i
t
)
nit(1 + γ
i
A,t+1)kt+1
]
,
where we used the optimal saving decisions of households (6) and (9), as well as the market
clearing wage and interest rates (1).
The net foreign assets of country i is the difference between their wealth at the end of
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period t (assets) and their capital stock used in period t+ 1:
NFAit
Y it
=
W it −Kit+1(
AitL
i
m,t
)1−α
(Kit)
α
=
W it − Ait+1Lim,t+1kt+1
AitL
i
m,tk
α
t
=
AitL
i
m,t
[
(1− α)pit(1−τ it−θit−1)
pit+β
−ωR1−ωt+1
kαt − 1−αα
(
β−ωR1−ωt+1
pit+β
−ωR1−ωt+1
τ it+1 + θ
i
t
)
nit(1 + γ
i
A,t+1)kt+1
]
AitL
i
m,tk
α
t
− A
i
tL
i
m,tn
i
t(1 + γ
i
A,t+1)kt+1
AitL
i
m,tk
α
t
=
(1− α)pit(1−τ it−θit−1)
pit+β
−ωR1−ωt+1
kαt −
[
1−α
α
(
β−ωR1−ωt+1
pit+β
−ωR1−ωt+1
τ it+1 + θ
i
t
)
+ 1
]
nit(1 + γ
i
A,t+1)kt+1
kαt
= (1− α)p
i
t(1− τ it − θit−1)
pit + β
−ωR1−ωt+1
−
[
1− α
α
(
β−ωR1−ωt+1
pit + β
−ωR1−ωt+1
τ it+1 + θ
i
t
)
+ 1
]
nit(1 + γ
i
A,t+1)
kt+1
kαt
The world capital accumulation equation, (15), implies:
kt+1
kαt
=
∑
iA
i
tL
i
m,t
pit(1−τ it−θit−1)
pit+β
−ωR1−ωt+1
(1− α)∑
i n
i
t(1 + γ
i
A,t+1)A
i
tL
i
m,t
[
1 + 1−α
α
(
θit +
β−ωR1−ωt+1
pit+β
−ωR1−ωt+1
τ it+1
)] ≡ Ψt+1.
Using this we can substitute for kt+1/(kαt ) in the equation for NFAit/Y it to get the following
expression:
NFAit
Y i
= (1− α)p
i
t(1− τ it − θit−1)
pit + β
−ωR1−ωt+1
−
[
(1− α)
(
β−ωR1−ωt+1
pit + β
−ωR1−ωt+1
τ it+1 + θ
i
t
)
+ α
]
nit(1 + γ
i
A,t+1)
Ψt+1
α
Using that in the steady state all parameters are constants, and that kt = kt+1, and hence
Ψt+1/α = R
−1, we get the expression in the Proposition:
NFAit
Y it
= (1− α)p
i(1− τ i − θi)
pi + β−ωR1−ω
−
[
(1− α)
(
β−ωR1−ω
pi + β−ωR1−ω
τ i + θi
)
+ α
]
ni(1 + γiA)
R
. (B-6)
Proof of Corollary 3. In a world with integrated capital markets, where countries share
common, constant values for p, γA, n, and only differ in their values for θi, τ i, the steady
state interest rate, R, is such that the global asset supply equals the global asset demand.
This is equivalent to saying that the net foreign asset position of a hypothetical country
characterized by the values (θ, τ) in the steady state is zero.
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The net foreign asset position of a country with parameters θi and τ i using (B-6) can be
expressed as:
NFAit
Y it
= (1− α)p(1− τ
i − θi)
p+ β−ωR
1−ω −
[
(1− α)
(
β−ωR
1−ω
p+ β−ωR
1−ω τ
i + θi
)
+ α
]
n(1 + γA)
R
.
From the above we can subtract the same expression for the hypothetical average country,
for which the value of the above is zero to get the expression given in the corollary:
NFAit
Y it
=
NFAit
Y it
− NFAt
Y t
= (1− α)p(1− τ
i − θi)
p+ β−ωR
1−ω −
[
(1− α)
(
β−ωR
1−ω
p+ β−ωR
1−ω τ
i + θi
)
+ α
]
n(1 + γA)
R
− (1− α) p(1− τ − θ)
p+ β−ωR
1−ω −
[
(1− α)
(
β−ωR
1−ω
p+ β−ωR
1−ω τ + θ
)
+ α
]
n(1 + γA)
R
= (1− α)p(τ − τ
i) + p(θ − θi)
p+ β−ωR
1−ω + (1− α)
(
β−ωR
1−ω
p+ β−ωR
1−ω (τ − τ i) + (θ − θi)
)
n(1 + γA)
R
= (1− α)(θ − θi)
[
p
p+ β−ωR
1−ω +
n(1 + γA)
R
]
+
p(1− α)(τ − τ i)
p+ β−ωR
1−ω
[
1 +
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
]
.
Proof of Proposition 3. The difference in net foreign assets as stated in (20) is:
∆(θ)
NFAt
Yt
≡ NFA
L
t
Y Lt
− NFA
H
t
Y Ht
= (1− α)(θH − θL)
[
p
p+ β−ωR
1−ω +
n(1 + γA)
R
]
.
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Taking its derivative with respect to n we get:
∂∆(θ)NFAt
Yt
∂n
= (1− α)(θH − θL)
∂R∂n ∂∂R
(
p
p+ β−ωR
1−ω +
n(1 + γA)
R
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
interest rate channel
+
(1 + γA)
R︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect

= (1− α)(θH − θL)
−ηn
 p (1− ω) β−ωR1−ω
n
(
p+ β−ωR
1−ω)2 + (1 + γA)R
+ (1 + γA)
R

= (1− α)(θH − θL)
−ηn p (1− ω) β−ωR1−ω
n
(
p+ β−ωR
1−ω)2 + (1 + γA)R (1− ηn)
 .
From applying Corollary 2 to the world interest rate, R, we know that ηn > 0, hence the
first term is negative. As long as ηn > 1 also holds, the second term is also negative, which
is exactly the condition stated in the proposition.
Similarly take the derivative of the above with respect to p to get:
∂∆(θ)NFAt
Yt
∂p
= (1− α)(θH − θL)
∂R∂p ∂∂R
(
p
p+ β−ωR
1−ω +
n(1 + γA)
R
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
interest rate channel
+
∂
∂p
(
p
p+ β−ωR
1−ω
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect

= (1− α)(θH − θL)
−ηp
 (1− ω)β−ωR1−ω(
p+ β−ωR
1−ω)2 + n(1 + γA)pR
+ β−ωR1−ω(
p+ β−ωR
1−ω)2

= (1− α)(θH − θL)
(1 + (1− ω)|ηp|) β−ωR1−ω(
p+ β−ωR
1−ω)2 + |ηp|n(1 + γA)pR
 > 0,
where we used that −ηp = |ηp|, as we know that ηp < 0 from applying Corollary 2 to the
world interest rate, R. As ω ≤ 1, both the first and the second term in the above sum are
positive.
To summarize, the difference in the net foreign asset position of a high-θ and a low-θ coun-
try increase as n falls if ηn > 1, and as p increases.
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Proof of Proposition 4. The difference in net foreign assets as stated in (21) is:
∆(τ)
NFAt
Yt
≡ NFA
L
t
Y Lt
− NFA
H
t
Y Ht
=
p(1− α)(τH − τL)
p+ β−ωR
1−ω
[
1 +
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
]
.
Taking its derivative with respect to n we get:
∂∆(τ)NFAt
Yt
∂n
= p(1− α)(τH − τL)

1 + γA(
p+ β−ωR
1−ω)
pβωR
ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+
∂R
∂n
∂
∂R

[
1 + n(1+γA)
pβωR
ω
]
p+ β−ωR
1−ω

︸ ︷︷ ︸
interest rate channel

+
∂(τH − τL)
∂n
p(1− α)
p+ β−ωR
1−ω
[
1 +
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
contribution rate channel
=
p(1− α)(τH − τL)
n
(
p+ β−ωR
1−ω)
[
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
− ηn
(
(1− ω)β−ωR1−ω
p+ β−ωR
1−ω
(
1 +
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
)
+ ω
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
)
− ε
(
1 +
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
)]
=
p(1− α)(τH − τL)
n
(
p+ β−ωR
1−ω)
[
Θ︸︷︷︸
direct effect
− ηn
(
(1− ω)φ˜0 (1 + Θ) + ωΘ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
interest rate ch.
− ε (1 + Θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
contribution rate ch.
]
=
p(1− α)(τH − τL)
n
(
p+ β−ωR
1−ω) ·[
− ε+ n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω (1− ε− ηnω)− ηn
(1− ω)β−ωR1−ω
p+ β−ωR
1−ω
[
1 +
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
]]
Since ηn > 0, a sufficient condition for the above to be negative is 1− ε− ηnω < 0, which is
exactly the statement in the proposition. If this holds, then as n falls, the net foreign asset
positions of a high- and a low-τ country diverge.
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The same derivation for p:
∂∆(τ)NFAt
Yt
∂p
= (1− α)(τH − τL) ∂
∂p
[
p
p+ β−ωR
1−ω
(
1 +
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+ (1− α)(τH − τL)∂R
∂p
∂
∂R
[
p
p+ β−ωR
1−ω
(
1 +
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
interest rate channel
+ (1− α)
[
1 +
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
]
p
p+ β−ωR
1−ω
∂(τH − τL)
∂p︸ ︷︷ ︸
contribution rate channel
=
(1− α)(τH − τL)
p+ β−ωR
1−ω
[
β−ωR
1−ω
p+ β−ωR
1−ω
(
1− n(1 + γA)
R
)
− ηp
(
(1− ω)β−ωR1−ω
p+ β−ωR
1−ω
(
1 +
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
)
+ ω
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
)
+
(
1 +
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
)
ε
]
=
(1− α)(τH − τL)
p+ β−ωR
1−ω
[
φ˜0
[
1− n(1 + γA)
R
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+ |ηp|
(
(1− ω)φ˜0 (1 + Θ) + ωΘ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
interest rate ch.
+ ε (1 + Θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
contribution r ch.
]
=
(1− α)(τH − τL)
p+ β−ωR
1−ω ·
(
β−ωR
1−ω
p+ β−ωR
1−ω
[
(1− ω)|ηp|
(
1 +
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
)
+
(
1− n(1 + γA)
R
)]
+ ω
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω |ηp|+
(
1 +
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
)
ε
)
=
(1− α)(τH − τL)
p+ β−ωR
1−ω ·
(
β−ωR
1−ω
p+ β−ωR
1−ω [(1− ω)|ηp|+ 1] + ε
+
n(1 + γA)
pβωR
ω
(
ωp+ β−ωR
1−ω
p+ β−ωR
1−ω |ηp|+ ε−
p
p+ β−ωR
1−ω
))
As long as the last term in brackets is positive, as longevity increases the net foreign asset
positions between a high- and a low-τ country diverge. A sufficient condition for the last
term to be positive is that |ηp| ≥ 1−εω .
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C Technical Appendix for Quantitative Section
This appendix provides further details on the solution method for the quantitative model
of Section 3.
C.1 Individual Optimization
The agent’s problem consists in choosing a path of consumption and asset holdings to max-
imize expected lifetime utility (26) subject to flow budget constraints (34)-(35) and credit
constraints (39).
C.2 Autarky Steady State
Consider a steady state in country i where eij,t = eij , conditional survival probabilities re-
main constant over time (pij,t = pij) and Li0,t+1 = (1 + γiL)L
i
0,t, so that the total population
grows at constant rate γiL, productivity grows at constant rate γ
i
A, and σ
i
t = σ
i in every
period. The steady-state contribution rate τ i must satisfy
τ i
J∑
j=0
Lij,te
i
jw
i
t = σ
ieiJ
J¯∑
j=J+1
Lij,tw
i
t+J−j,
which implies
τ i = σieiJ
J¯∑
j=J+1
(
Lij,t∑J
`=0 e
i
`L
i
`,t
)
wit+J−j
wit
= σieiJ
J¯∑
j=J+1
(
(1 + γiL)
−j∏j−1
m=0 p
i
m∑J
`=0 e
i
`(1 + γ
i
L)
−`∏`−1
m=0 p
i
m
)
(1 + γiA)
J−j. (C-1)
Let ki denote the autarky steady state level of the capital-efficient-labor ratio in country i,
Kit
AitLˆ
i
t
= ki.
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The market clearing condition at the end of period t is
Kit+1 = A
i
t+1Lˆ
i
t+1k
i =
J¯−1∑
j=0
Lij,ta
i
j,t. (C-2)
In order to determine the steady state equilibrium, we need to characterize net asset
holdings aij,t for a given value of ki. To do so, we observe that in steady state, aij,t grows
over time at rate γiA, while Q
i
t grows over time at rate γiY = (1 + γ
i
A)(1 + γ
i
L)− 1. Thus, there
exists {a˜ij}J¯−1j=0 and Q˜i such that
aij,t = a˜
i
jw
i
t−j, for all j, t (C-3)
Qit = Q˜
iL0,tw
i
t, for all t. (C-4)
As a preliminary step, we analyze the joint determination of the values of {a˜ij}J¯−1j=0 and Q˜i
for a candidate steady state interest rate Ri.
To start with, we show how to solve for {a˜ij} taking Q˜i as given. (33) implies that in
steady state, the level of bequests qit received at the end of period t must satisfy
qit
∑
j∈B
pijL
i
j,t = Q
i
t.
Therefore using (C-4), we can write for all j ∈ B
qij,t = q
i
t = Q˜
i L0,t∑
j∈B p
i
jL
i
j,t
wit
= Q˜i
(∑
m∈B
pim
∏m−1
`=0 p
i
`
(1 + γiL)
m
)−1
wit
= Q˜i
(∑
m∈B
pim
∏m−1
`=0 p
i
`
(1 + γiL)
m
)−1
(1 + γiA)
jwit−j =: q˜
i
jw
i
t−j. (C-5)
Moreover the labor income received in period t by a worker of age j is
wij,t = e
i
jw
i
t = e
i
j(1 + γ
i
A)
jwit−j =: w˜
i
jw
i
t−j,
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and the amount of pensions received in period t by a retiree of age j is
piij,t = σ
iwiJ,t+J−j = σ
ieiJw
i
t+J−j = σ
ieiJ(1 + γ
i
A)
Jwit−j =: p˜i
i
jw
i
t−j, J < j ≤ J¯ .
Now, consider the individual optimization problem of an agent born in period t − j. This
agent faces a sequence of labor income wij,t = w˜ijwit−j , constant tax rate τ i, pension transfers
piij,t = p˜i
i
jw
i
t−j and wealth transfers qij,t = q˜ijwit−j . Since in our environment the solution to
the individual optimization problem is homogenous of degree one in the level of wages
and transfers, the optimal path of asset holdings {aij,t} for this agent satisfies aij,t = a˜ijwit−j ,
where {a˜ij} denotes the optimal path of asset holdings in the normalized optimization prob-
lem of an individual who faces a sequence of wages {w˜ij}, tax rate τ i, and transfers {p˜iij}
and {q˜ij}. Note that since q˜ij = q˜ij(Q˜i) as per (C-5), the normalized amount of unintentional
bequests Q˜i affects wealth accumulation, that is {a˜ij = a˜ij(Q˜i)}.
Conversely individual wealth accumulation, encapsulated in {a˜ij}, affects the normal-
ized amount of unintentional bequests Q˜i. Indeed, using the definition of Qit in (32), we
have in steady state
Qit =
J¯−1∑
j=0
(1− pij)Lij,taij,t
⇒ Q˜iLi0,twit =
J¯−1∑
j=0
(1− pij)Lij,ta˜ijwit−j
⇒ Q˜i =
J¯−1∑
j=0
(1− pij)
Lij,t
Li0,t
wit−j
wit
a˜ij
⇒ Q˜i =
J¯−1∑
j=0
(1− pij)
∏j−1
`=0 p
i
`
[(1 + γiL)(1 + γ
i
A)]
j
a˜ij. (C-6)
The value of Q˜i in the autarky steady state is obtained by solving (C-6) with a˜ij = a˜ij(Q˜i),
which immediately pins down normalized asset holdings {a˜ij}.
Finally, using the fact that aij,t = a˜ijwit+1/(1 + γiA)
j+1 and Lij,t =
(∏j−1
`=0 p
i
`
)
Li0,t+1/(1 +
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γiL)
j+1, the market clearing condition (C-2) can be rewritten as
{
J¯∑
j=0
eij
∏j−1
`=0 p
i
`
(1 + γiL)
j
}
(ki)1−α = (1− α)
J¯−1∑
j=0
∏j−1
`=0 p
i
`
[(1 + γiL)(1 + γ
i
A)]
j+1
a˜ij(k
i), (C-7)
where the notation a˜ij(ki) captures the fact that (normalized) net asset positions depend on
the steady-state rate of return, as previously described. Equation (C-7) implicitly defines
the level of the capital-effective-labor ratio in the autarky steady state.
C.3 Integrated Steady State
Consider an integrated steady state where (1+γiA)(1+γ
i
L) = 1+γY in all countries, although
countries may be heterogenous in other respects. Social security systems are balanced in all
countries, so that τ i and σi satisfy (C-1) for all i. Capital-effective-labor ratios are equalized
across countries,
Kit
AitLˆ
i
t
= k.
The integrated steady state can be determined along the same logic as for the autarky
steady state. First, taking the steady state value of the gross rate of return R as given, we
consider the (normalized) optimization problem of an individual in country i with labor
income sequence {w˜ij}Jj=0 with w˜ij = eij(1 + γiA)j and constant tax rate τ i, pension transfers
p˜iij = σ
ieiJ(1 + γ
i
A)
J−1 for J < j ≤ J¯ , and wealth transfers {q˜ij}j∈B satisfying (C-5) for some
Q˜i. Let {a˜ij(Q˜i)}J¯j=0 denote the optimal path of wealth. For each country i, define Q˜i(R) the
unique value of Q˜ solution to (C-6), i.e.,
Q˜ =
J¯−1∑
j=0
(1− pij)
∏j−1
`=0 p
i
`
(1 + γY )j
a˜ij(Q˜).
Stationarity and homogeneity imply that, if the world steady-state interest rate is R, the
wealth at age j of an agent born in period t in country i is aij,t+j = a˜ijwit, where a˜ij =
a˜ij[Q˜
i(R)].
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The market clearing condition at the end of period t is
∑
i
Kit+1 ≡ k
∑
i
Ait+1Lˆ
i
t+1 =
∑
i
J¯−1∑
j=0
Lij,ta
i
j,t, (C-8)
which is equivalent to
{∑
i
Ait+1L
i
0,t+1
J∑
j=0
eij
∏j−1
`=0 p
i
`
(1 + γiL)
j
}
k1−α = (1− α)
∑
i
Ait+1L
i
0,t+1
J¯−1∑
j=0
∏j−1
`=0 p
i
`
(1 + γY )j+1
a˜ij(k).
Let ηi ≡∑Jj=0 eij(∏j−1`=0 pi`)(1+γiL)j , and introduce country weights
λi ≡ η
iAit+1L
i
0,t+1∑
n η
nAnt+1L
n
0,t+1
.
The market clearing condition can be rewritten
k1−α = (1− α)
∑
i
λi
ηi
J¯−1∑
j=0
∏j−1
`=0 p
i
`
(1 + γY )j+1
a˜ij(k)
= (1− α)
J¯−1∑
j=0
1
(1 + γY )j+1
∑
i
λi
ηi
(
j−1∏
`=0
pi`
)
a˜ij(k).
Special case: when ηi = η in every country, the market clearing condition simplifies to
k1−α =
1− α
η
J¯−1∑
j=0
1
(1 + γY )j+1
[∑
i
λi
(
j−1∏
`=0
pi`
)
a˜ij(k)
]
,
where λi corresponds to the constant share of country i in world effective labor.
C.4 Dynamics
The law of motion for kt ≡ (kit)Ni=1 depends on whether countries are financially integrated
or in financial autarky. If countries are closed financially in period t, the market clearing
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condition in country i is
Ait+1Lˆ
i
t+1k
i
t+1 =
J¯−1∑
j=0
Lij,ta
i
j,t. (C-9)
The generations who matter in period t are those born in periods t− J¯+1 to t. Thus market
clearing in period t pins down kit+1 given
• lagged values KiL,t+1 ≡ {kiτ}tτ=t−J¯+1 and future values KiF,t+1 ≡ {kiτ}t+J¯τ=t+2,
• past, current, and future productivity {Aiτ}t+Jτ=t−J¯+1,
• past, current, and future age-income profile, i.e., {eij,τ+j}Jj=0 for τ = t− J¯ + 1, ..., t,
• tax rates τ iτ for τ = t− J¯ + 1, ..., t+ J ,
• replacement rates Σit+1 ≡ {σiτ}t+J¯τ=t−J¯+J+2,
• demographic composition in period t, driven by {Li0,τ}tτ=t−J¯+1 and {pij,τ+j}t−1−τj=0 for
τ = t− J¯ + 1, ..., t− 1,
• mortality tables in period t, i.e., {pij,τ+j}J¯−1j=t−τ for τ = t− J¯ + 1, ..., t,
• past, current,22 and future amounts of unintentional bequests Qit+1 ≡ {Qiτ}t+J¯−1τ=t−J¯+1.
If instead countries are financially integrated in period t, then rates of return are equal-
ized across countries
Rit+1 = Rt+1, for all i,
and so are their capital-effective-labor ratios
kit+1 ≡ Kit+1/(Ait+1Lˆit+1) = kt+1, for all i.
The market clearing condition in period t is
∑
i
Kit+1 = kt+1
∑
i
Ait+1Lˆ
i
t+1 =
∑
i
J¯−1∑
j=0
Lij,ta
i
j,t. (C-10)
22Alternatively, the amount of unintentional bequests left in period t, Qit, could be determined along with
kit+1, given {Qiτ}τ∈{t−J¯+1,...,t−1}⋃{t+1,...,t+J¯−1}, by imposing that the pair (kit+1, Qit) jointly solves (32) and
(C-9).
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Thus market clearing in period t pins down kt+1 given
• lagged and future values, KL,t+1 ≡ (KiL,t+1)Ni=1 and KF,t+1 ≡ (KiF,t+1)Ni=1,
• productivity {Aiτ}t+Jτ=t−J¯+1 for i = 1, ..., N ,
• age-income profile, i.e., {eij,τ+j}Jj=0 for τ = t− J¯ + 1, ..., t and i = 1, ..., N ,
• tax rates τ iτ for τ = t− J¯ + 1, ..., t+ J and i = 1, ..., N ,
• replacement rates Σt+1 ≡ (Σit+1)Ni=1,
• demographic composition in period t, driven by {Li0,τ}tτ=t−J¯+1 and {pij,τ+j}t−1−τj=0 for
τ = t− J¯ + 1, ..., t− 1, and i = 1, ..., N ,
• mortality tables in period t, i.e., {pij,τ+j}J¯−1j=t−τ for τ = t− J¯ + 1, ..., t, and i = 1, ..., N ,
• total amounts of unintentional bequests Qt+1 ≡ (Qit+1)Ni=1.
C.5 Shooting Algorithm
Consider an experiment where countries start in financial autarky and integrate in pe-
riod X (say, X = 0). Hence for t ≥ X + 1, kit = kt, for all i. Around the integration
period, we feed the model with “shocks” to productivity, demography, social security, and
age-income profiles. We allow for shocks over the window [X − T, X + T]. All shocks are
perfectly anticipated. The sequence of contribution rates {τ it} is taken as given. Adjust-
ments to the replacement rates {σit} are obtained as part of the equilibrium construction.
In order to determine how the global economy responds to financial integration and
other contemporaneous shocks, we use the following algorithm.
1. We assume each country starts at its autarkic steady state, and that the economy does
not react to future shocks before period X − T , for T > T large. That is, kit = ki∗ for
t ≤ X − T − 1. The initial steady state for country i is determined by the country-
specific parameters θi, {pij}J¯−1j=0 , along with (γiL, γiA), {eij}Jj=0, and (τi, σi) as described
in Section C.2. From the initial steady state, we obtain unintentional bequests Qit for
65
t ≤ X − T − 1. In particular,
QiX−T−1 = (1− α)AiX−T−1(ki∗)αLi0,X−T−1Q˜i[ki∗].
2. We assume the global economy has converged to its integrated steady state k∗ in
period X + T + 1. That is, kt = k∗ for t ≥ X + T + 1. The final steady state is
determined by country-specific parameters, along with final relative weights {λi}Ni=1,
as described in Section C.3. Unintentional bequests in period X + T + 1 are
QiX+T+1 = (1− α)AiX+T+1(k∗)αLi0,X+T+1Q˜i[k∗].
3. The transition path of the economy is obtained iteratively as follows.
(a) We start with a guess for the paths of capital-effective-labor ratios {k(0)t }X+Tt=X−T ,
replacement rates {σ(0)t }X+Tt=X−T , and unintentional bequests {Q(0)t }X+Tt=X−T . We set
k
i(0)
t = k
i∗ for t ≤ X and ki(0)t = k∗ for all i for t ≥ X + 1. We set initial values
{Qi(0)t } by interpolating between QiX−T−1 and QiX+T+1. Given {ki(0)t }, the initial
path {σi(0)t } follows from the balanced budget condition, Eq. (31).
(b) For n ≥ 0, given the paths {k(n)t }X+Tt=X−T , {σ(n)t }X+Tt=X−T , and {Q(n)t }X+Tt=X−T , the up-
dated paths {k(n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T , {σ(n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T , and {Q(n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T are obtained as
follows.
i. First, we solve for the updated path {k(n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T , given replacement rates
{σ(n)t }X+Tt=X−T and transfers {Q(n)t }X+Tt=X−T .
– We obtain {k(n+1)t }Xt=X−T by iterating on the autarkic forward-backward
difference equation (FBDE) in each country (see Section C.4). Specifi-
cally, for each country i, and for t = X − T, . . . , X , we compute ki(n+1)t as
the solution to the autarkic FBDE, given Ki(n)L,t , K
i(n)
F,t , Σ
i(n)
t , and Qi(n)t .
– We determine the common path {k(n+1)t }X+Tt=X+1 by iterating on the inte-
grated FBDE. Specifically, for t = X + 1, . . . , X + T , we compute k(n+1)t
as the solution to the integrated FBDE given K(n)L,t , K
(n)
F,t , Σ
(n)
t , and Q(n)t .
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ii. Given {k(n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T , the updated sequence of replacement rates {σ(n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T
is obtained from the balanced budget condition, Eq. (31).
iii. Finally, we obtain the updated path of transfers {Q(n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T as per Eq.
(32), where the asset holdings of all generations in each period are computed
given {k(n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T , {σ(n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T , and {Q(n)t }X+Tt=X−T .
(c) We iterate on n until convergence, based on the distance between two consecu-
tive paths {k(n)t }X+Tt=X−T and {k(n+1)t }X+Tt=X−T .
4. We verify that T is large enough for the distances |ki(∞)X−T − ki∗| and |k(∞)X+T − k∗| to fall
below some convergence threshold.
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D Results from Additional Experiment
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Figure D.1: Capital Flows Between a Developed and an Emerging Region, with Equal
Productivity Growth
Notes: The young-old ratio corresponds to the ratio of the size of the group of agents of age j = 1, 2 (i.e.,
20-40) over the size of the group of agents of age j = 5, 6, 7 (i.e., 60-90). Credit constraint and replacement
rates for the group of emerging countries are set equal to their counterparts in developed countries. The
values of other calibrated parameters are given in Table 1.
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